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INTRODUCTION
Risk-taking is a distinctively American value.1 From the frontier spirit of
the settler to the entrepreneurial sense of the founder of a start-up company,
Americans have been taught to realize "nothing ventured, nothing gained. '"2
This embracing of risk prompts individuals in the United States to participate
in two closely intertwined activities: gambling and investing.
1 RICHARD 0. DAVIES & RICHARD G. ABRAM, BETTING THE LINE 146 (2001) (quoting
sociologist James Frey as saying, "Risk is a very significant part of our lives.... People
don't want to admit it, but a great part of gambling is consistent with the American way.").
2 See id. (quoting psychologist Robert Custer as saying, "The Americans came in as the
pioneers, the risk takers. They don't mind taking the risk, and they will take the
consequences.").
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To characterize investing as gambling has become a trite and toothless
analogy. However, most worn-out proverbs remain in the conventional
wisdom because a kernel of truth continues to resonate with those who heed
them. In fact, the stereotype of an investor as a gambler seems particularly
well deserved. To gamble is to put something of value at risk on an uncertain
outcome; in other words, "Wagers are economic choices under uncertainty. '3
Under this broad definition, investors gamble with every purchase of a
financial instrument.4 In making a securities purchase, some investors buy
common stock of a corporation because they have studied that company's
business plan, find that model to be superior to the company's competitors, and
believe that the company's managers will continue to increase profits, thus
raising an undervalued stock price.5 Conversely, some investors buy stock not
because they assess positive public information but because they have a good
feeling. 6 Others may buy stock merely because they know that others have
bought the same or similar stock with some measure of success. 7 Still others
choose to buy or sell stocks based solely on a prediction of whether others will
buy or sell.8 In other words, many investors buy stock for some of the same
reasons that gamblers may choose certain slot machines, lottery numbers, or
squares on a roulette table, or choose to bet or fold a certain poker hand.
Although many investors act as gamblers, both law and society view
investing and gambling quite differently. Regulators characterize investing as
an enterprise of skill in which the assiduous and diligent may earn deserved
rewards. 9 Conversely, gambling is viewed as an enterprise of chance that
3 Antonio M.R. Vern6n, Market Efficiency and March Madness: Empirical Tests of
Point Spread Betting 1 (Dec. 23, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Social
Science Research Network), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 340820.
4 See Thomas Lee Hazen, Disparate Regulatory Schemes for Parallel Activities:
Securities Regulation, Derivatives Regulation, Gambling, and Insurance, 24 ANN. REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 375, 401-12, 416-18 (2005) (comparing investing, hedging, insurance,
and gambling as risk-taking activities).
5 See Lynn A. Stout, Technology, Transactions Costs, and Investor Welfare: Is a Motley
Fool Born Every Minute?, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 791, 803-05 (1997) (commenting that these
"information arbitrageurs" may be outnumbered by speculators).
6 See Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise Trader Approach to Finance,
J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1990, at 19, 23 (describing uninformed traders who respond to
"pseudo-signals," such as the advice of "financial gurus").
7 This type of "noise trading" can be described as "trend chasing" or "positive feedback
trading." Id. at 23, 29.
8 Id. at 29-30 (describing the tendency of arbitrageurs to "jump[] on the bandwagon" by
predicting where investor sentiment is going and when it will stop).
9 See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC
Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation,
available at http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Mar. 20, 2006) ("The
world of investing is fascinating and complex, and it can be very fruitful.... [I]nvesting is
not a spectator sport. By far the best way for investors to protect the money they put into
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encourages the lazy and untalented to divert useful capital into a chaotic
system whereby an undeserving few reap ill-gotten gains while the vast
majority foolishly lose.10 In stock market investing, the financial
intermediaries are viewed as earning modest fees for assisting others to invest
wisely, but in gaming, "the house," or the casinos, are detached hawkers who
win every game. 1 However, many gambling activities and investing activities
can be described equally as speculation, or the assumption of unusual, but
considered, risk for the prospect of commensurate gain. Notwithstanding this
reality, investing is an activity that the law supports and encourages, 12 but
gambling is an activity that the law at least nominally discourages and at most
prohibits. 13
These disparate views of speculation are reflected in the regulation of these
two activities. For most of the past century, gambling in the United States has
been illegal by default. 14 Over the past thirty years, exceptions have been
drawn to legalize certain types of gambling in certain geographical areas;
however, the operation of these legal gambling enterprises is subject to state
regulatory control. 15 Buying a passive interest in a corporation, by contrast, is
legal by default. Admittedly, as the interests in a corporation become more
widely disseminated and held, the corporation must fulfill various reporting
and disclosure obligations and offer investment opportunities only by
observing certain formalities. 16 But the road to becoming a publicly-held
corporation has more transaction cost barriers than legal ones. 17
the securities markets is to do research and ask questions.").
10 See JOHN GILMORE, LOTTO: FUN OR FOLLY? 27-28 (2001) (quoting a seminary
academic as saying, "The prevalence of gambling points to a breakdown of the Puritan ethic
of work .... [T]his ethic has been replaced by the something-for-nothing philosophy").
11 See Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from
Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. L. REV.
627, 650 (1996) ("Stockbrokers play a useful function in both retail and institutional sales in
transmitting accessible and customized information about a very complex financial world.").
12 See Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure,
and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611, 618 (1995) ("A fundamental premise of the
current regulatory scheme is that stock trading is socially beneficial.").
'3 See infra Part II.A.
14 For example, until 1976, only Nevada had legalized commercial casino gambling.
JOHN LYMAN MASON & MICHAEL NELSON, GOVERNING GAMBLING 33 (2001).
15 NAT'L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM'N, FINAL REPORT 3-5 to -6 (June 18, 1999)
[hereinafter "NGISC REPORT"] (comparing the "Nevada" model of treating casinos as
corporate citizens and the "New Jersey" model of strictly controlling all elements of casino
activity).
16 See LARRY D. SODERQUIST & THERESA A. GABALDON, SECURITIES LAw 28-29 (2d ed.
2004) (describing the indirect expenses of going public, such as having to comply with the
Exchange Act's periodic reporting requirements).
1 See id. at 28 (explaining that compensation to securities firms is the greatest expense in
going public, followed by legal costs).
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In comparing the regulatory environments of gambling and investing,
responses to innovations that test the existing frameworks provide telling
contrast. In particular, comparing the regulatory responses to both online
investing and online gambling reveals interesting, and quite troubling,
differences in the fundamental policies behind federal regulation of these two
types of Internet speculation. As one might expect, the federal government has
been quite receptive to online investing, 18 but unpredictably inhospitable to
online gambling. 19 This fairly harsh approach to online gambling is a reversal
of the federal government's delegation of gambling regulation to the states, 20
its receptivity to tribal gaming, 21 and its acceptance of the recent liberalization
of gambling laws in most U.S. states. 22
The fierceness of the federal government's official stance in this area is
puzzling until one realizes the one factor that is at stake in traditional investing,
online investing, and traditional gambling, but not at stake in Internet
gambling: money. Investing creates value for U.S. corporations, powerful
financial intermediaries, and the federal government through taxation of
dividends and capital gains. The federal and state governments have been
receptive to progressive efforts to legalize casinos, which arguably can create
tax revenue and jobs. 23 Lotteries, once reviled, now promise to increase state
funds available for worthy public causes such as public education.24 By
contrast, Internet gambling, hosted by foreign operators, not only generates
zero governmental revenue and zero jobs, it also threatens traditional
18 See Laura S. Unger, SEC Comm'r, Empowering Investors in an Electronic Age,
Remarks at the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Annual
Conference (May 17, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch380.htm.
19 NGISC REPORT, supra note 15, at 5-12 (recommending that the federal government
respond to the threat of online gambling by (1) explicitly prohibiting it with no exemptions;
(2) targeting for prosecution intemet service providers, wireless device manufacturers, credit
card providers, money transfer services, and other aiders and abettors; (3) prohibiting
transfers of money to these sites; (4) prohibiting states from permitting online gambling; and
(5) encouraging foreign countries not to permit these sites).
20 See MASON & NELSON, supra note 14, at 57 ("[M]ost of American politics and
policymaking concerning gambling take[] place in the states.").
21 See Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (codified
at 25 U.S.C. 2701 (2004)) (stating that the Act's goal is "to promote tribal economic
development, tribal self-sufficiency, and strong tribal government").
22 See MASON & NELSON, supra note 14, at 2 (describing the proliferation of legalized
gambling since 1960).
23 See id. at 34 (detailing casino proponents' economic arguments of "jobs, tourism,
capital investment, [and] tax revenues to state and local government").
24 Cf R. Randall Bridwell & Frank L. Quinn, From Mad Joy to Misfortune: The Merger
of Law and Politics in the World of Gambling, 72 Miss. L.J. 565, 679 (2002) (condemning
the Georgia "Hope Scholarship," funded by the Georgia lottery since 1993, as a wealth
transfer from poor lottery players to college students).
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gambling.25
This Article advocates a more principled, less self-interested basis for
regulation: the federal government should prohibit, regulate, leave alone, or
encourage speculative activities based on the utility of the enterprise and the
corresponding social cost of that activity, not on whether the lure of the
activity can be harnessed for government gain. Although morality myths
prevail in anti-gambling rhetoric, the abundance of legalized gambling activity
in almost all states weakens the authority of those myths as governmental
policy. I propose that the U.S. government abandon its efforts to prohibit
Internet gambling and instead create an appropriate regulatory scheme, similar
to that used for physical casinos, to ensure the integrity of Internet gambling.
The federal government's loose regulation of financial speculation should
inform regulators' treatment of gambling speculation. Specifically, the federal
government's decision to treat online trading similarly to traditional trading
provides a model for treating Internet gambling similarly to traditional
gambling.
This Article begins in Part I by continuing the tradition of examining the
similarities of certain gambling activities and investment activities. One
element of my comparison is to banish the binary model of enterprises of skill
and games of chance. Adding to this body of scholarship, this Part presents a
model spectrum, with categories of activities ranging from entertainment to
speculation to active ownership. After comparing similar activities according
to each one's utility and social costs, this Article will then compare how the
United States regulates both industries in Part II. Part III explores the ensuing
question of why similar speculative activities along the spectrum are regulated
differently. In Part IV, attention turns to the participants in these speculative
activities to determine whether characteristics of either gamblers or investors
should result in categorically different legal treatment. In Part V, this Article
examines the U.S. government's incongruous position with respect to online
investing, in which its stated concerns for reckless retail investors are quite
muted, and online gambling, in which its stated concerns for reckless gamblers
are passionate and inconsistent with current policy. Part VI explores the
government's full commitment to combating online gambling. This Article
explores ways to harmonize the different approaches to speculation in Part VII
and concludes that the government's stance against Internet gambling is
misguided, its arguments for prohibition are pretextual, and its myopia on this
topic is damaging its credibility in the international arena.
25 See Ryan D. Hammer, Does Internet Gambling Strengthen the U.S. Economy? Don't
Bet on It, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 103, 118-19 (2001) (arguing that online gambling
cannibalizes casino revenue and decreases state income).
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I. THE SPECTRUM OF SPECULATION
A. Model: From Entertainment to Wagering to Ownership
Any attempt to substantively distinguish all types of gambling (from slot
machines to poker to sports betting) from all types of investing (from long-
term ownership to day trading to purchasing derivatives) is illusory. 26 These
activities vary in their similarity with one another, but the universes of
investing and gambling overlap greatly.2 7 Even during the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, drawing a line between immoral gambling and
industrious investing was difficult. As capitalism flourished, many Americans,
especially those in agrarian communities, were skeptical that passive
investment in the activities of others for profit differed much from gambling.28
Furthermore, in an age of bucket shops, the confidence man selling dubious
26 See Hazen, supra note 4, at 403-04 ("The illegality of, and law's disdain for, gambling
has moral overtones which makes it difficult to draw the line between bona fide market
transactions and a wager."). The line is so close, in fact, that a recent bill to prohibit online
gambling included an exception for the purchase of securities, derivatives, and insurance
products. Unlawful Internet Gambling Funding Prohibition Act, S. 627, 108th Cong.
§ 5361(1) (2003). The Act defines "bet or wager" to exclude
(i) any activity governed by the securities laws ... for the purchase or sale of
securities ... ; (ii) any transaction conducted on or subject to the rules of a registered
entity or exempt board of trade pursuant to the Commodity Exchange Act; (iii) any
over-the-counter derivative instrument; (iv) any other transaction that (1) is excluded or
exempt from regulation under the Commodity Exchange Act; or (I) is exempt from
State gaming or bucket shop laws under section 12(e) of the Commodity Exchange Act
or section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; (v) any contract of indemnity
or guarantee; (vi) any contract for insurance; (vii) any deposit or other transaction with
an insured institution.
2' For example, Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P., the financial services firm, owns Cantor Index
Limited, a U.K. subsidiary offering "online, real-time financial spread betting on stock
indices, equities, currencies, commodities, and bond futures" as well as "fixed-odds sports
betting." Hoover's Fact Sheet for Cantor Index Limited, http://www.hoovers.com/cantor-
index/--ID 102439--/free-co-factsheet.xhtml (last visited Mar. 17, 2006). Cantor
Fitzgerald is also affiliated with Cantor G&W (Nevada), L.P., a firm engaged in gaming
activities, particularly wireless gaming activities, in Delaware. Howard Stutz, Gambling:
Give Yourselfa Hand, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Nov. 28, 2005, at D1. On September 29, 2005,
Cantor Fitzgerald launched Cantor Casino, an offshore online casino that guarantees not to
accept customers from the United States. Press Release, Cantor Fitzgerald, Cantor
Fitzgerald Launches Cantor Casino and Cantor Gaming (Sept. 29, 2005), available at
http://www.prnewswire.co.uk/cgi/news/release?id= 154960.
28 See ANN FABIAN, CARD SHARPS AND BUCKET SHOPS: GAMBLING IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA 154 (1999) ("And since farmers believed that wealth originated with
crops in the field, those who lived off exchanges appeared to be modem incarnations of the
scheming gamblers who brought nothing to market but tricks and ruses and crept away with
profits to which they had no right."); GILMORE, supra note 10, at 33-35 (examining sermons
from nineteenth-century Protestant ministers warning that profiting from stocks was
immoral).
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financial products seemed very similar to the confidence man selling
opportunities in games of chance. 29
This Part proposes a new model for assessing the qualities of various
speculation activities, or activities where money is wagered in expectation of a
future reward in a climate of uncertainty. 30 Although some have attempted to
distinguish gambling from investing based on risk or the expected value of a
gamble or investment, this model creates a spectrum of activity based on the
element of chance involved.31 On one end of the chance/skill spectrum,
chance exclusively controls the return of an economic wager. On the other end
of the spectrum, the skill of the wagerer controls the return to a greater extent.
Note that placement assumes players have perfect skill in each activity; for
someone with zero knowledge of poker or stock trading, that game becomes
one of chance to that player. However, even the most skilled player cannot
turn a game of pure chance into a game of skill. Furthermore, at no point in
the spectrum does the element of chance disappear, as even in contests of skill,
the impact of chance can never be eliminated.
FIGURE I
Pure Chance -+ Skill Mixed With Chance
29 See FABIAN, supra note 28, at 188-89 (detailing the subtle distinction between farmers'
complaints about commodities speculators and the government's response, which was to
pass laws against "bucket shops," -those "brokerage houses that bad no real connection
either to stock markets or commodities exchanges" -to legitimize honest speculators).
3o Myriad types of wagers could be included along the spectrum, including contracts that
shift risk, such as insurance contracts and legal contingent fee arrangements.
31 This distinction is not novel; laws have historically distinguished games of chance
from games of skill as areas of prohibited activity. See Bridwell & Quinn, supra note 24, at
644-46 (comparing the "English Rule" that banned games of "pure chance" to the broader
"American Rule" that banned games in which chance was the "dominant element").
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In general terms, gambling activities appear more often at the "pure chance"
end of the spectrum, whereas capital ownership anchors the opposite end of the
chance/skill spectrum. However, many activities defy their labels of gambling
and investing and can be grouped with activities bearing the other label. The
purpose of constructing this model is to have a more useful and coherent view
of the entertainment value, utility, and social costs of these activities for the
purpose of constructing an argument that similar speculation activities should
be regulated similarly.
Note that this model does not duplicate a spectrum of decreased risk or a
spectrum reflecting an increase in the expected value of a wager. For example,
a bet in roulette on the color black poses less risk than many investments. 32
Likewise, trading on insider information involves lower economic risk than
passive ownership of stocks. This spectrum reflects the role that chance plays
in the outcome of a wager or investment; in other words, the extent to which
the occurrence of a random event influences the return. 33 In determining
whether activities are predominated by skill or chance, courts look to factors
such as whether participants can learn with experience and whether skillful
players win on average more than unskilled players.34
Each activity on this spectrum may provide entertainment value to the
participant, positive utility to the market for that activity, and a benefit or cost
to society as a whole. Generally, the entertainment value to the participant is
greater to the left of the spectrum when compared to the utility of the activity
and the social benefit. These characterizations of the spectrum do not hold true
at all points of the spectrum, possibly because entertainment is a subjective
value idiosyncratic to the wagerer. Interestingly, the gambling industry
advertises itself as entertainment to give the industry credibility, - and the
securities industry touts the utility of capital ownership for the same reason.36
B. Games of Pure Chance
1. "L" Games
Anchoring one end of the chance/skill spectrum are what gambling
professionals call "L" games;37 statistically, if you play these games long
32 Note, however, that this bet is not an even-odds bet because, depending on the roulette
wheel, there is at least one possibility that is neither black nor red, but green.
33 One definition of gambling for the purpose of gaming law contains three elements:
consideration, prize, and chance. 1. NELSON ROSE & MARTIN D. OWENS, INTERNET GAMING
LAW 11 (2005).
34 Id. at 20-21.
15 See infra Part I.B.2.
36 See infra Part I.E.
37 See ARTHUR S. REBER, THE NEW GAMBLER'S BIBLE 6 (1996) (defining losing games,
"Type L" games, as "those games where the house has an incontrovertible edge and where
you must, in the long run, lose" and winning games, "Type W" games, as "those games
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enough, you will lose. These games include lotteries,3 8 electronic gaming
devices (EGDs), and casino games such as slot machines (both mechanical and
computerized), keno, video poker, baccarat, roulette, and craps. 39 Although
players may be tempted to believe that some skill is involved, the outcome of
these games is completely controlled by chance. 40 In these games, the odds
favor the house; therefore, over time the house wins and the player loses.41 A
player may end a playing session with a positive return on aggregate wagers,
but if the player returns and continues playing, the laws of statistics will catch
up with that gambler.42
2. Entertainment Value, Utility, and Social Costs
Given the statistical certainty that the average player will lose at these
games of chance, the economic rationality of players of these games is
questionable. For some, gambling serves no useful purpose and has zero
utility because, as a group, players of "L" games will put more money into the
system than they will receive. 43 For others, any mutual exchange between
individuals free to make a choice is accompanied by a mutual benefit. 44 In
between these views is the argument made by casino owners and players that
in these types of casino games, the utility is the entertainment value to the
wagerer.45 Instead of spending the same amount of money on a movie or a
where, with knowledge and skill, you can, in fact, win").
38 See ANDREW N.S. GLAZER, CASINO GAMBLING THE SMART WAY: HOW TO HAVE MORE
FUN AND WIN MORE MONEY 103 (1999) (arguing that "lotteries are such poor gaming risks
that no casino commission would let a casino get away with running one").
39 See REBER, supra note 37, at 43-115 (describing slots, keno, and lotteries as having the
worst odds, followed by roulette, baccarat, and craps).
40 Meir Statman, Lottery Players/Stock Traders, 58 FIN. ANALYSTS J., Jan.-Feb. 2002, at
17-18 (giving as an example the fact that most lottery players believe that the numbers they
choose have a greater chance of winning than numbers picked at random by a computer).
41 See REBER, supra note 37, at 12 (commenting that professional gamblers do not play
Type L games but "invest" in games at which, "[a]s time goes by, they are highly confident
that they are going to win").
42 See id. at 45 ("The longer you play a Type L game the more certain it becomes that
you will lose and the more certain it becomes that you will lose what you are
mathematically expected to lose.").
43 id.
44 Cf Stout, supra note 12, at 614-15 (explaining that it is the "tradition of classical
economics" to equate "exchange between rational actors" with "mutual benefit and a
corresponding increase in social welfare").
4' A fourth argument is that a low-stakes, low-probability wager with a large payoff does
hold a positive utility. For most people, the price of the wager is minimal and represents no
change in the wagerer's standard of living. The payoff, however, does represent a positive
change in standard of living. Therefore, the expected value even of an exceedingly low
probability of a change in standard of living is greater than the minimal price of the wager.
See Langevoort, supra note 11, at 636-37 (discussing how most people have a "status quo
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concert, casino patrons can make a rational decision to spend the money at the
casino and enjoy a stimulating session of gaming. 46
These wagers have few, if any social benefits beyond the entertainment of
the player.47 The sole utility of the wager may merely be the player's own
distraction. In seeking to legalize casino gambling, however, supporters point
to increased jobs and community spending, but these arguments have yet to be
concretely substantiated or disproved. 48 In addition, many would argue that
the social costs of these activities, including increased crime, bankruptcies, and
gambling addiction, outweigh increased revenue. 49
C. Type A Speculation: Wagers Involving Mostly Chance and Skill
1. "W" Games
Next along the chance/skill spectrum are games of mixed skill and chance,
with chance playing as important if not more important a role than skill. In the
casino, these are the "W" games, meaning games at which it is possible to win
consistently over time, such as blackjack and poker.50 Notably, "W" games
cost more to play at casinos than "L" games. 51 In both blackjack and poker,
the outcome is based in part on the odds of the next card played being a certain
card or in a certain class of cards. These odds change with every card played.52
In blackjack, the skill involved is knowing the odds regarding the next play
bias" with regard to risk taking and are wary of high-risk investments).
46 See REBER, supra note 37, at 10 (positing that a gambler may be "winning" merely by
spending an enjoyable three hours playing poker and meeting fellow card players, even
though the player leaves the session ten dollars down).
47 Hazen, supra note 4, at 377 ("In contrast to investing, hedging and insurance,
gambling is not generally viewed as a productive activity or one that provides any benefit to
society beyond its entertainment value.").
48 See Melissa Schettini Kearney, The Economic Winners and Losers of Legalized
Gambling, 58 NAT'L TAX J. 281, 286 (2005) (referring to a study that came to a mixed
conclusion regarding the net balance of positive economic effects and social costs of Native
American casinos).
41 See id. at 290 ("The weight of the empirical evidence suggests that casinos do in fact
impose negative social costs on surrounding communities, most notably, an increased
prevalence of property and violent crime.").
50 See REBER, supra note 37, at 6 (explaining that as the odds in blackjack and poker
fluctuate during the game, players with the greatest skill will systematically beat players
with less skill).
51 Slot machines accept denominations as low as a penny, but most "W" games have
minimum bet limits of $5 to $100 or more.
52 For example, if blackjack were being played with one deck, although rare at a casino,
the odds of the first card in the deck being an ace would be 4 in 52. If the first card played
in the deck is a king, then the odds of the second card in the deck being an ace would be 4 in
51. See REBER, supra note 37, at 140 (discussing wagering strategies based on the "count"
at various times during play).
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and playing accordingly. However, blackjack involves playing against the
dealer, who is a professional participant with a high level of skill.53 In
addition, in the case of the tie, or a "push," a player does not earn a return on
the wager.54
Along the chance/skill spectrum, I put poker to the right of blackjack.
Arguably, the game of poker requires more skill than the game of blackjack.
In blackjack, the size of the wager is determined at the beginning of the game,
and so the return is predetermined. In poker, the amount of the wager
increases during the game, and part of the skill is not only knowing when to
continue playing and when to fold, but how much to continue betting when not
folding.55 The expected return of a poker hand changes not only with the dealt
hand and the other cards played, but also with the size of the pot. 56 Poker is
played against other players, not against the house, so a great deal of skill is
involved in reading the other players, bluffing, and not revealing one's
strategy. 57
2. Derivatives
This category contains the types of economic investment that industry
watchers might call "speculation." These investments both are riskier and rely
on chance to a greater extent than other investments, and so have the potential
for large returns compared to smaller wagers. 58 Although stock trading and
stock holding appear at different points in the spectrum, at least two subsets
of stock trading can be grouped as Type A speculation with skill-based
gambling: derivatives and day trading. Therefore, in between blackjack and
poker, and in the same general category, the purchasing of a derivative
involves some mix of skill and chance. This category could be divided many
ways because the term "derivative" encompasses a wide array of financial
products in which the actual conditions of return are based on an underlying
53 See 1. NELSON ROSE & ROBERT A. LOEB, BLACKJACK AND THE LAW 3-4 (1998)
(hypothesizing that casinos' resentment of card counters is based on the fact that blackjack
players' winnings come from the casino while poker players' winnings come from the other
players).
14 REBER, supra note 37, at 126.
15 See id. at 150 (arguing that, in poker, chance affects all players equally, leaving skill as
the determining factor).
56 See id. at 163 (suggesting that the factors to consider in a hand are the odds of a
particular hand, the amount of money in the pot, the amount of money that opponents have
available for betting, and the amount of money remaining).
57 See id. at 173 (explaining, for example, that "[t]ells are players' mannerisms that
signal information about their cards or their intentions").
58 Langevoort, supra note 11, at 636 ("[S]ophisticated investors at least understand that
risk and return operate in tandem: the possibility of above-average return inevitably carries
with it above-average risk."); see Stout, supra note 12, at 708 ("[S]peculation may play a
large, if not dominant, role in derivatives trading.").
59 See Figure 1, supra, Part I.A.
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stock, commodity, financial benchmark, stock index, or other grouping of
assets.60 These investments incorporate an element of chance not found in
ordinary stock investments: the element of time. In stock trading and buying,
the investor is wagering that the stock price will increase; in derivatives, the
investor is wagering that prices will rise or fall by a certain date. 61 Complex
derivatives based on groups of benchmarks further increase the element of
chance by attracting wagers that certain benchmarks will rise and fall together
and by a certain date. 62
Two major types of derivatives are futures contracts and stock options. The
purchase of a futures contract in an agricultural commodity may be based on
no superior knowledge at all of any factor that may affect the price of that
agricultural commodity. The participant may be entering into the futures
contract merely as a wager on a price change. 63 Therefore, the return on the
wager is subject to chance, but the skill involved is knowing when one's
current risk position justifies the price of the wager. The purchase of an option
based on the price of a publicly-traded stock, like the purchase of the
underlying stock, may involve either knowledge of the company or the
industry. Alternatively, the purchase may be based on a pure hunch.
Derivatives and "W" games are similar in that both are, at most, zero-sum
games. 64 In either case, the wagerer receives a return on the wager or not. In a
60 See Thomas Lee Hazen, Rational Investments, Speculation, or Gambling?
Derivative Securities and Financial Futures and Their Effect on the Underlying Capital
Markets, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 987, 989-90 (1992) (describing generally how stock options and
futures contracts, two main categories of derivatives, operate).
6! See id. (explaining that options will expire in a certain amount of time if they are not
exercised and that futures contracts create a delivery obligation for a specific date in the
future); see also Stout, supra note 12, at 705:
[A] bullish trader might buy index futures, expecting stock prices to rise so that the
stocks to be delivered will be worth considerably more than the futures price on the
delivery date. Conversely, a bear will sell index futures, expecting she will soon be
able to purchase the stocks she has agreed to deliver at a lower price.
62 Although all investments have a known risk, the probabilities of certain happenings
increase over time. The probability of a price increase or decrease of a short-term
investment is lessened as the time is shortened. For this reason, the amount of time
remaining in a stock option contract affects the price of that option under the Black-Scholes
model. Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities,
81 J. POL. ECON. 637, 638 (1973). An analogy may be helpful. Someone flips a coin
continuously. The probability that the coin will land on tails sometime in the next five
minutes is greater than the probability of that event happening in the next thirty seconds.
63 See Stout, supra note 12, at 708 ("[D]erivatives markets are likely to attract a very
high portion of those optimists willing to bet they are better than the next trader at
forecasting the future of industries, interest rates and national economies.").
64 See Hazen, supra note 60, at 1006 (describing how for every winner in a derivative
contract there must be a loser, and one cannot expect to break even in the long term once
transaction costs are included). Furthermore, poker players in casinos pay a time fee,
making poker a negative-sum activity.
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card game, the player either wins the hand and receives the winnings, or loses
the hand and the wager. If the purchaser of a call stock option wins the "bet"
that the stock price would move to a certain level, then the purchaser receives
winnings in the amount that the price had moved beyond the exercise price. 65
If the stock price does not reach that point, then the option is "out of the
money" and the wagerer is out the price of the option or premium. 66 In a
futures contract, the losing half of the contract must either make delivery or
purchase a contract that will wash out the original futures contract.67
3. Day Trading
Another candidate for this category of speculation is day trading, although
former Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chairman Arthur Levitt
jokingly characterized most day trading as an "L" game, not a "W" game.
Levitt publicly opined that day trading was more like gambling and less like
speculation because speculation required some knowledge or information, and
day trading did not seem to involve either. 68 Day trading is a phenomenon
borne of the Internet and the technological ability to trade stocks online. 69
During the late 1990s, a great number of individuals who were not market
professionals began actively trading stocks as a full-time pursuit.70 Not all
online investors are day traders; the phrase "day trader" refers to the fact that
most stocks bought were sold within a day.71 This strategy relies more on
chance than skill. Most intraday stock price fluctuations result from anomalies
in the market, and day traders wager on the occurrence and duration of these
65 ROBERT W. HAMILTON & RICHARD A. BOOTH, BUSINESS BASICS FOR LAW STUDENTS:
ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS 411 (3d ed. 2002) (describing a call option for
AOL stock with an exercise price of $40, which will net a holder of 333 call options
$1,055,600 should the price rise to $82).
66 Id.
67 [d. at 423.
68 Arthur Levitt, Plain Talk About On-Line Investing, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 1093, 1096
(1999) ("Day traders are not really speculating because traditional speculation requires some
market knowledge. They are instead gambling, which does not require market
knowledge.").
69 Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral
Approach to Securities Litigation, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 135, 154 (2002) (describing the
Internet-era phenomenon of direct trading by investors via websites, without the direct
guidance of an intermediary who may have advised the investors on risk or suitability).
70 See Caroline Bradley, Information Society Challenges to Financial Regulation, 37
TOLEDO L. REV. 307, 320 (2006) (commenting that although day traders considered trading
their full-time job, they were not "classic professional market participants").
71 Caroline Bradley, Disorderly Conduct: Day Traders and the Ideology of "Fair and
Orderly Markets", 26 J. CoRP. L. 63, 63 n.2 (2000) ("The New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) has suggested that the term 'day trading' should be understood to refer to 'the
purchase and sale of the same security in the same day in a margin account."') (citing Press
Release, NYSE, NYSE and NASD Propose Higher Level of Margin Requirements for Day
Trading (December 10, 1999), available at http://www.nyse.com/press/press.html).
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anomalies. 72 Depending on the amount of skill used by the day trader, this
trading philosophy may seem like a "W" game or an "L" game; most likely it
is an "L" game that looks like a "W" game.
4. Utility
Involved in each of these speculative activities is some degree of
entertainment, and possibly some degree of utility. Obviously, many card
players enjoy playing the games, and some enjoy the games more when the
wagers are high.73  Some investors also experience the same type of
entertainment in making risky bets via derivatives purchases or day trading. 74
Although card playing does not seem to have much utility beyond being a
part of the entertainment industry, financial speculation, when engaged in
wisely, is frequently described as having a legitimate economic purpose. 75
However, use of derivatives for speculation does not create wealth; profits
created in favor of one contract party represent a mere wealth transfer. 76 Most
compellingly, speculation in both the stock options market and the futures
market has often been defended on the grounds that investors in otherwise
undiversified positions need to be able to hedge against their inherently risky
positions. 77 Farmers, for example, face the need to diversify by hedging
against crop prices. 78 Airlines whose profits are dependent on the price of fuel
oil should be able to hedge against an increase in energy prices by entering into
futures contracts. 79 Banks with long-term positions at a fixed or floating rate
72 See BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOwN WALL STREET 24 (6th ed. 1996)
("[S]hort-run changes in stock prices cannot be predicted.").
71 See Langevoort, supra note 11, at 637 (describing the "visceral thrill to placing a high
payoff bet").
74 The Connecticut Council on Problem Gambling has published a quiz to determine
whether an investor has a problem gambling in the stock market. One question asks
whether the investor has experienced "extreme highs" or "extreme lows" when trading.
Connecticut Council on Problem Gambling, Investing and Gambling Problems,
http://www.ccpg.org/financial/investing-gambling-problems.asp (last visited Feb. 13,
2006).
75 See Hazen, supra note 60, at 1007 (summarizing three benefits of commodity
derivatives: "(1) risk allocation; (2) price discovery - which results in more accurate pricing
of the underlying commodity; and (3) a more accessible source of pricing information"); see
also Stout, supra note 12, at 706 (repeating the view that if derivatives are used mainly for
hedging, and not for speculating, then they can be "mutually beneficial").
76 Hazen, supra note 60, at 1006-07.
77 See id. at 1007 ("Allocating risk to others thus permits externalizing the risks which
these entities are less efficient at controlling.").
78 See id. at 1019 (stating that utility arguments for derivatives are stronger for physical
commodities markets "because speculators provide liquidity for farmers, elevators,
producers, and suppliers who want to hedge").
71 See Micheline Maynard, Surging Fuel Prices Catch Most Airlines Unprepared,
Adding to the Industry's Gloom, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2005, at C2 (comparing airlines that
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of interest may need to hedge against inflation risk with a swap derivative.80
These types of hedges based on a countervailing financial position provide
useful vehicles for shifting risk. However, some derivatives holders are not
hedging risky positions but are mere speculators. Participants in these
underlying markets argue that the presence of nonparticipant speculators in the
futures markets lead to volatility in pricing;8 ' others argue that these
"speculators" are necessary to provide liquidity to the market. 82 If all ranchers
need to hedge against a drop in cattle futures, then someone, a non-rancher
presumably, must necessarily take that bet, or agree to the other side of the
futures contract.
Similarly, day trading also has debatable utility. Because these traders have
an illusion of control in their activity, they may not realize that the average day
trader does not beat the market. 83 When the high transaction costs of active
trading are included, day trading becomes a negative-sum game in which the
average trader loses money.84 Day trading attracts those who believe that they
can better trade their portfolio than a market professional, and this
overconfident group tends to ignore market realities. 85 Commentators argue
that day traders create liquidity in the market. 86 However, others argue that
did not use futures contracts in crude petroleum to hedge against budgeted estimates of jet
fuel prices with the few that did, such as Southwest Airlines, a "shining example of how to
hedge fuel").
80 See WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 129-31 (5th
ed. 2003) (describing the mechanics of interest rate swaps).
81 See FABIAN, supra note 28, at 171-73 (recounting how, as early as the late nineteenth
century, agricultural producers criticized speculators who purchased derivative wagers on
the grounds that that agricultural prices would decline and argued that bearish speculation
fulfilled prophecies by driving prices down, thus injuring producers). This argument
continues today, as producers in underlying commodities complain that pure speculators
artificially inflate or deflate prices away from a supply/demand equilibrium. Recently, Peter
Huntsman, president of Huntsman Corporation, has been very outspoken about his view that
natural gas futures speculators, including hedge funds, use a market of physical
commodities to gamble on paper. See Simon Romero, Natural Gas Inquiry Finds Price
Wasn't Manipulated, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2004, at C2 ("The way the system is set up, big
hedge funds benefit from price volatility while manufacturers are getting slammed.").
82 NYMEXNatGas Price Leads to Questions About "Speculators ", 32 SEC. WEEK, Jan. 3,
2005, at II (reporting that some "industry participants" in the natural gas futures market
argue that speculators play a necessary role by effectively underwriting producers' risk).
83 See Statman, supra note 40, at 16-17 (citing the North American Securities
Administration Association for the statistic that in the 1999 bear market, 70 percent of day
traders lost money).
84 See A. Levitt, supra note 68, at 1096 (citing a study that found that all but one trader
out of sixty-eight at a day trading firm had lost money); see also Langevoort, supra note 69,
at 147 (pointing out that active trading lags behind passive investing because of transaction
costs).
85 Langevoort, supra note 69, at 147.
86 See Stout, supra note 12, at 683.
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day traders add to inefficiencies in the market and exacerbate irrational
trends.8 7  Supporters of the efficient market hypothesis argue that market
professionals, or "smart money," will capitalize on market inefficiencies and
move the market back to equilibrium. Critics of this approach, on the other
hand, theorize that arbitrageurs act as poker professionals, sensing that a player
overvalues his hand and upping the ante or buying with the herd, thereby
forcing more amateurs to lose more money into the system before the market
reverts to equilibrium. 8
Opponents of gambling generally refer to social costs of problem
gamblers.8 9  Tellingly, these costs are also predictable with problem
speculators such as day traders. As discussed later,90 each type of speculation
has a cautionary tale about how poker, derivatives, or day trading ruined
someone's life.
D. Type B Speculation: Wagers Involving Some Chance/Some Skill
On this spectrum of chance, 91 sports betting is grouped with trading in
individual stocks. Both are passive wagers on the future actions of others.
Here, I make a distinction between stock trading and stock holding. Although
traders may make informed trades, their ultimate goal is quick profits in a
relatively short time horizon. Choosing these stocks and knowing when to sell
does take skill, and the most skillful should realize more profits than the
unskillful. However, the stock price is subject to elements outside of the
investor's control: the decisions of management, trends in the industry, and the
overall market economy. The stock price may change based on either factors
specific to that company, that industry, or the market as a whole. Similarly,
gamblers that bet on individual sports games, like football, basketball, or
baseball, may make informed bets based on the information available on the
teams and players involved. Like the wide availability of information on
publicly-held corporations, the access to information on sports teams and
players is remarkable. 92 Notwithstanding the strength of the players in a sports
game, the final outcome of the game is easily impacted by elements beyond the
gambler's or the players' control, such as injuries, lucky plays, and the mood
of the crowd.
17 See Bradley, supra note 71, at 86-87 (describing day trading as threatening the
"orderliness" of the market).
88 See Langevoort, supra note 69, at 148 (discussing the theory of "smart money" forces,
as well as countervailing forces that prevent effective arbitrage).
89 See infra Part V.B. 1.
90 See infra Part III.A.
91 See Figure 1, supra, Part I.A.
92 See DAVIES & ABRAM, supra note 1, at 4 (ascribing the growth in sports betting in the
latter half of the twentieth century to the advent of television and the expansion of cable
television programming, and more recently, to radio talk shows and the Internet).
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1. Sports Betting
Like poker, in both sports betting and stock trading, there is no "house."
Sports betting is conducted through a bookmaker, who can either make odds or
create a point spread on an individual sporting event.93 Most sports bookies
create a point spread, or a "line. ' 94 This line is expressed by the bookie
predicting a winner, plus a number of points, such as "Green Bay Packers by
3."95 A gambler cannot merely bet that the Packers will win, but must either
choose to bet that the Packers (i) will win by at least three points or (ii) will
either lose or win by less than three points. Conventional wisdom says that the
bookmaker sets this line so that the number of bets on one side of the line will
be the same as the number of bets on the other side of line.96 The bookie
profits by retaining the "juice" or "vig" for "vigorish, '97 which is usually ten
percent of each bet.98 If the bookie is setting the line at equilibrium, then the
bookie makes money whether bettors win or lose. 99 Most lines are set a few
days before the game and may change slightly as bets are placed. 10 0 The line
that formed the bettor's bet continues to be that bettor's line on game day.10 1
Surprisingly, one economist has used empirical data to challenge this
assumption and has claimed that gamblers make their own gambles with the
93 RBER, supra note 37, at 277.
94 See id. at 275 (commenting that the "bookie" that sets the line may in fact be a group
of experts and consultants).
95 See id. at 277 (explaining that the point spread "represents the number of points that
one team is favored over the other").
96 DAVIES & ABRAM, supra note 1, at 169 ("Book managers do not like to have money
'in play'); REBER, supra note 37, at 276 ("[T]he ultimate goal is to establish a line that will
attract approximately half of the action to each side of the wager .....
97 REBER, supra note 37, at 275.
98 See, e.g., Christopher P. Liss, Beating the Book,
http://www.coverwire.com/gambling-book.htm; Gambling Terms,
http://www.mcasports.com/gamblingterms.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2006); Sportsbook
Definitions, http://www.offshore-sportsbook-casino.net/offshore-
sportsbook definitions.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2006).
99 DAVIES & ABRAM, supra note 1, at 169 ("Essentially the manager is seeking to 'split'
the monies bet on an event to guarantee that he will make a profit no matter the outcome of
the contest."); see REBER, supra note 37, at 276 ("In sports betting ... the line and/or odds
are set by people who are deeply knowledgeable about the sport, and they are very tough to
beat.").
100 Steven D. Levitt, How Do Markets Function? An Empirical Analysis of Gambling on
the National Football League I n.2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 9422, 2002) (noting that in his sample set of 20,000 sports bets placed by 285 bettors
over an NFL season, the line announced on Tuesday prior to a Sunday football game
changed an average of 1.4 times and that in the vast majority of those situations, the price
moved by one-half of one point).
101 REBER, supra note 37, at 276.
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line, taking advantage of asymmetries in skill and information in the market. 10 2
Ironically, because sports gambling is generally illegal outside Nevada,
smaller, illegal markets create more asymmetry and allow for more speculation
by the bookmaker in these markets. 10 3
If the bookmaker's line is set at equilibrium, investors as a group will
recover less than half of accumulated wagers, after taking into account the
bookie's juice, 10 4 making sports betting also a negative-sum game.
2. Stock Trading
Likewise, most retail investors trade stock through a market maker, who
creates a bid/ask price and moves the price so that there are an equal number of
people who want to sell a stock and who want to buy a stock. 10 5 The market
maker, or specialist, has a bid price and an ask price. The bid price is the price
at which the market maker is willing to buy the stock and the ask price is the
price he will sell the stock for. There is usually a small difference between the
two prices. 10 6 As more people want to sell to the market maker, or as more
people bet that the price is going to go down from a given bid price, the market
maker will have a glut in that stock, and so will adjust the bid and the asking
price to create demand on the "ask" side, to attract investors who will bet that
the price will rise from the asking price.10 7 The "spread" here is the same as
the bookmaker's juice, although proportionately much smaller to the
investment. The investor who buys stock, or who bets that the price of a stock
will rise, pays not only the market maker's spread, but also a commission to
the broker who placed the bid.
The bid/ask price is the equilibrium price that produces the same number of
buyers as sellers of a security. However, in the securities field this price is said
to reflect the homogenous expectation of all investors as to the fundamental
value of a fractional share of that company, given all publicly known
information. 10 8  This assumption, based on the Efficient Capital Market
102 Levitt, supra note 100, at 27 (concluding that bookmakers do not set the line at
equilibrium but instead exploit their greater talent for predicting the outcome of games and
that they take great stakes in the outcome of games). But see Vern6n, supra note 3, at 6
(surmising that the point spread is unbiased in legal sports markets as opposed to illegal
sports markets, such as the online sportsbook scenario that Levitt studied).
103 See REBER, supra note 37, at 288 (commenting that the line is likely to be different in
the hometowns of the two competing teams).
104 See Vern6n, supra note 3, at 4-6 (explaining that the breakeven point for the
bookmaker is 47.6% / 52.4% because of the commission).
105 WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS AND FINANCE
403 (9th ed. 2004) (detailing the different approaches taken by dealers' markets and auction
markets to handling buy and sell orders).
106 See id. at 401 (mentioning that electronic developments like Instinet allow investors
to avoid paying the spread).
107 Id. at 403.
108 See Hazen, supra note 60, at 987:
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Hypothesis, seems to be a legal fiction, although one that is frequently
debated. 10 9 In gambling parlance, the price is merely the line at which the
market maker has as many up bets as down bets.
3. Utility
Both sports betting and stock trading have some degree of entertainment
value. 110 Although the utility of sports betting may be limited, many believe
that the ubiquitous availability of sports wagering drives the professional
sports industries. Instead of the public's passion for competitive sports driving
a complementary market in sports betting, the gambling industry may create a
paying audience for professional sports. This dynamic is most clearly seen in
the rise of "Fantasy Sports" leagues and the corresponding increased demand
for television sports programming. 11
The utility of stock trading is similar in type to, although arguably more
defensible than, the utility of day trading. The conventional wisdom has
always been that stock trading has a positive social benefit, but others disagree,
pointing out that active stock trading is still a zero-sum game, or negative-sum
with transaction costs, even if passive stock holding is not. 112 Although stock
holders, or "value investors," can expect a long-term profit over time, the
active traders do not beat market returns over time after trading costs are
considered."l 3 Moreover, overall trading returns decrease with increases in
According to the hypothesis, the market establishes and maintains stock prices at a
level that bears a rational relationship to the "true value" of a publicly traded company,
because the price reflects the total mix of information available and accounts for the
views of the various sectors of the investor community.
109 See id. at 988 ("Considerable debate continues as to whether the Efficient Capital
Market Hypothesis accurately reflects market behavior, and whether it is a valid premise
upon which to base regulation.").
110 Hazen, supra note 4, at 401 (commenting that the stock market is a form of
entertainment for some investors); see Vem6n, supra note 3, at I (hypothesizing that
gamblers are not indifferent as to equal sports betting gambles but instead would pay an
entertainment premium to bet on particular teams).
111 See Chris Ballard, Fantasy World, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 21, 2004, at 80 (giving
ESPN as an example of a sports industry participant that greatly benefits from the existence
of fantasy sports leagues).
112 Statman, supra note 40, at 14 ("The stock-trading game.., is a negative-sum game.
In the absence of trading costs, management fees, and expenses, stock traders can expect to
match the returns of an index of all stocks. But after trading costs are considered, they can
expect to lag that index."); see Stout, supra note 12, at 622 (pointing out that every stock
seller will either lose or benefit in an inverse proportion to the amount that the buyer will
lose or benefit).
113 HERSH SHEFRIN, BEYOND GREED AND FEAR: UNDERSTANDING BEHAVIORAL FINANCE
AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INVESTING 132 (2000) (citing a six-year study of 60,000 active
traders and finding that even though the traders "beat the market" by 60 basis points, their
trading costs were equivalent to 240 basis points, leaving them at a loss).
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trading. 114 Although many argue that increased participation in stock trading
increases the amount of capital available to corporations, 1' 5 money exchanged
in the secondary market does not go to issuers, only to sellers of stock. 116 Only
the purchase price of stock in public offerings go to the issuer, and most issuers
have only one public offering of stock. Trading occurs in the secondary
market, so increasing corporate capital cannot be seen as a direct public benefit
of stock trading.' 17
In addition, similar to day trading, stock trading may also create
inefficiencies in the stock market. Investors' false beliefs that they can beat
the market may lead them to erroneously value certain stocks, creating false
price signals and causing them to invest more or less than they would
otherwise. 118 Therefore, not only will capital be misdirected into acquisition
and transaction costs of active trading, but capital will also be misdirected into
certain stocks.' 19
The existence of the secondary trading market seems to serve only the
purpose of allowing a few investors, mostly professional investors, to profit
consistently, much like sports betting or even poker. Another group that
benefits from stock trading is the securities intermediaries, the brokers and
market makers who receive a commission on every trade, not on every dollar
of profit. 120 Therefore, these intermediaries tout active trading strategies, even
114 See id. (repeating the study's findings that the most active traders underperformed the
market by 500 basis points).
115 See Stout, supra note 12, 685 (arguing that if the primary purpose of the secondary
markets is to provide liquidity in order to encourage capital investment, then the secondary
market could disappear altogether, because "the annual costs of secondary market trading
likely equal or exceed the total amount of capital that firms raise from new issues in the first
place").
16 See Hazen, supra note 4, at 386 ("All of the proceeds from these secondary sales,
after applicable commissions to the securities brokers handling the transaction, go to the
investors who are parting with their securities. None of these proceeds from secondary
transactions in the securities markets flow back to the issuers.").
117 See Stout, supra note 12, at 685 (pointing out that investors, not issuers, benefit from
the secondary markets). However, the existence of a secondary market attracts capital to
issuers. Many original investors, such as venture capital firms, would not agree to fund a
new company without the possibility of an IPO at some future date that would allow venture
capital firms to sell their shares at a profit. The securities market allows investors to get
their capital out of the corporation without harming the corporation's bottom line. ROBERT
W. HAMILTON & RICHARD BOOTH, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 183 (3d ed.
2001) ("The existence of a market permits insiders to cash out some or all of their
investment and diversify.").
118 See Stout, supra note 12, at 680-81 (discussing whether stock pricing distortions lead
to serious problems).
1' Id. at 681-82.
120 Id. at 642 ("Brokers are paid a commission on every stock transaction they execute,
profiting from trades regardless of whether the trading investor profits.").
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though they themselves are the primary beneficiaries. 121 The utility of the
secondary stock trading market, and the sports betting market, seems to be to
allow professional bettors to profit at the expense of amateurs. The argument
that trading provides liquidity in the market 122 becomes a euphemism for the
need to have a sucker on one side of every bet. The costs involved in
maintaining a secondary securities market and, on an individual level,
maintaining actively traded portfolios, may be seen as a welfare cost if the
benefits on average are negative for the average investor. 123
Perhaps the SEC encourages retail investing for the same reason that casinos
encourage amateur gamblers to participate. A truly efficient stock market
would not produce large profits for any investor. However, reckless investors
provide arbitrage opportunities for professional investors. Without reckless
investors, the profits to be made in the capital markets would be much smaller.
In addition, the financial services industry makes money on every trade
through a paid commission, whether the trade is foolish, inspired, or informed.
E. Ownership: Wagers Involving Mostly Skill/Some Chance
To the right of the spectrum are activities that require less explanation.
These are activities that involve individuals making capital investments of their
money, property, or labor in the hopes of realizing a return on that investment
in the future. As noted previously, no amount of skill contributed to these
skill-based activities can eliminate the element of chance. First are passive,
but long-term ownership investments, either in publicly-held corporations or in
other business organizations. At the end of the spectrum 124 are activities where
the investor is an active participant in managing the enterprise, thus requiring
more skill and knowledge of the enterprise. These activities could include
anything from formal economic activity such as starting a business to informal
economic activity such as investing tuition and labor in the acquisition of a law
degree. The degree of risk will vary greatly with the type of enterprise, but the
utility should be self-evident: the provision of capital for the creation of
products and services.
F. Inside Bets: Insider Sports Betting and Insider Trading
Although a thorough discussion of the utility of both insider sports trading
and insider securities trading is beyond the scope of this paper, the location of
these activities on the spectrum is worth noting. Although these activities
involve less financial risk than other activities, they are regulated more closely
than most activities at the right end of the spectrum. Most sports leagues ban
121 See id. at 642 (hypothesizing that brokers may knowingly or unknowingly steer
clients into perceived new opportunities when the clients should adopt a long-term holding
strategy).
122 See id. at 623 (criticizing the liquidity argument for stock trading as "weak").
123 See id. at 677.
124 See Figure 1, supra, Part I.A.
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gambling on their sport by players, whether or not a gambler wagers on the
gambler's own team. 125 In the securities industries, corporate insiders may
trade stock in their own companies, and in fact are encouraged to do so. These
employees may in fact receive stock, options, appreciation rights, or other
derivatives of the company's stock as part of their compensation. 126 However,
insiders or their tippees may not trade on material, nonpublic information, and
certain insiders must make a filing with the SEC describing any trade after the
trade is executed. 127
II. REGULATION OF SPECULATION ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES
Many commentators have reasoned that the flourishing of many types of
gambling in the colonial United States and then on the Western frontier was a
result of the entrepreneurial character of those who settled the United States. 128
The risk-seeking, prospector mentality fueled not only Western expansion, but
the growth of both the stock exchanges and gambling. 29 Historian John
Findlay described the American people as "a people of chance," and this
character trait both helped to grow the economy and found an outlet in
gambling. 130 Given this shared origin, the division of these two types of
speculation into one that was morally just and one that was morally troubling is
in itself dubious and disconcerting. 31
125 See DAVIES & ABRAM, supra note 1, at 148-52 (describing the rise and fall of Pete
Rose, widely thought to have broken major league baseball's "ironclad ban prohibiting
gambling on baseball," a rule put in place after the 1919 Black Sox scandal). Besides
attempting to keep scandals out of the league, antigambling rules may also be
paternalistically designed to protect young people unaccustomed to sudden wealth. See id.
at 147-48 (retelling the heartbreaking story of All-American Art Schlicter, whose promise as
an NFL first-round draft pick was destroyed by his compulsive gambling addiction).
126 See generally Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial
Power versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847 (2002).
127 SODERQUIST & GALBADON, supra note 16, at 143 (describing the application of Rule
10b-5 to insiders who disclose "material, nonpublic information to another party, who then
trade[] securities based on the information").
128 See JOHN FINDLAY, PEOPLE OF CHANCE 4 (1986).
129 See THOMAS BARKER & M/ARIIE BRITZ, JOKERS WILD: LEGALIZED GAMBLING IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 21-22 (2000) ("In the early nineteenth century new gambling
forms appeared among the wealthy and merchant classes stockjobbers (stockbrokers) and
land speculators.").
13 See generally FINDLAY, supra note 128, at 4 (1986) (chronicling the Western
expansion of the United States and the risk-seeking nature of the people that settled
California and the other Western states).
131 See FABIAN, supra note 28, at 6-7 ("Although they attacked gambling, reformers
recognized that profits on the stock markets were often the results of lucky gambles and that
it was difficult to assert a vast moral difference between stock markets and gambling
casinos.").
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A. Historical Background of Gambling Regulation
1. Gambling Before 1931
The United States has a complex history of regulating gambling activity. In
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, gambling was fairly widespread,
including card games, 132 racetracks, 133 and particularly lotteries, as colonists
imported this popular money-raising device from Europe. 134 Accumulating
capital for public purposes was difficult for state and municipal governments
before the institution of standard taxation regimes. 135 Raising capital for long-
term projects was also difficult for private enterprises before the emergence of
the banking industry and the modem corporation, with the ability to lock in
shareholder capital indefinitely and offer shareholders limited liability in
return. 136 The lottery filled this void and allowed the government and private
parties who petitioned the government to use lotteries to raise capital for public
goods. Lotteries were used as modem-day bond offerings, with private brokers
launching raffle-style lotteries for the purpose of attracting monies for large-
scale endeavors such as public infrastructure and private construction
projects. 137 The states did not run these lotteries, but authorized private groups
to conduct them.138 For example, monetary support for colonial troops during
the Revolutionary War was collected through a lottery, as was money to
improve the Erie Canal 139 and to build roads in various states. 140 Lotteries
132 See BARKER & BRITZ, supra note 129, at 24 (commenting that card games were most
popular in the Western states and providing as an example the card club run by Wyatt Earp
and Doc Holliday in Tombstone, Arizona).
133 See William A. Taggart & Jacqueline Wilks, Gambling in the American States:
"Finding Some Action" Has Never Been Easier, 9 GAMING L. REV. 3, 3 (2005).
134 See Gerald Willmann, The History of Lotteries 12 (Aug. 3, 1999) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://willmann.bwl.uni-kiel.de/-gerald/history.pdf (describing the
first lottery in the New World as the 1746 lottery in New York to finance fortification of the
city). In fact, a lottery conducted in England helped to fund the Virginia Company. The
Jamestown colony was also funded by a lottery conducted in London by King James 1.
FINDLAY, supra note 128, at 11-14.
135 BARKER & BRITZ, supra note 129, at 20. The Sixteenth Amendment, which
empowered the United States government to impose an income tax, was not ratified until
February 13, 1913. Modem lotteries are often described as ways to generate state revenue
without raising taxes. Id. at 78.
136 See Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for
Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 387-89, 389 n.3
(2003) (noting that by 1800, only 335 corporations had been chartered in the United States,
and not all states offered limited liability to those incorporated in their state).
137 See MASON & NELSON, supra note 14, at 8 (discussing the use of lotteries in all
thirteen colonies to fund worthy causes).
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 See, e.g., Phalen v. Virginia, 49 U.S. 163, 167 (1850) (describing the lottery
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financed buildings at Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Dartmouth, and Williams, as
well as lighthouses and jails. 14 1 Religious groups frequently used lotteries to
raise money for new buildings. 142 Although more popular in the Southern
colonies, lotteries could be found even in colonies with a strong Puritan
influence, such as Massachusetts. 143 Unfortunately, private lottery companies
strayed from pure public purposes in the nineteenth century, and some lotteries
were found to be fraudulent. 144
Although the vast majority of states had prohibited lotteries prior to 1862,145
either because of concerns of fraud or of the questionable morality of
lotteries, 146 the war-torn Southern states revived the private-run lottery in an
attempt to raise state revenue. 147 As lottery states began to sell tickets to
residents of non-lottery states 148 through the U.S. mails and wire offices,
nongambling states turned to the federal government to intervene in the state
regulatory experiment on gambling. The federal government passed
legislation culminating in the Federal Anti-Lottery Act in 1895,149 which was
upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1903 as a proper exercise of federal
lawmaking power under the Commerce Clause.150 By 1894, every state had
conducted by the Fauquier & Alexandria Turnpike Road company for the benefit of
improving three miles of the turnpike road).
141 GILMORE, supra note 10, at 114; MASON & NELSON, supra note 14, at 8; Willmann,
supra note 134, at 12-13.
142 FABIAN, supra note 28, at 1; see MASON & NELSON, supra note 14, at 8 (commenting
that the Quakers were the only Christian denomination that did not conduct a lottery during
this period).
143 DAVIES & ABRAM, supra note 1, at 9.
144 See MASON & NELSON, supra note 14, at 8 (describing a fraudulent lottery in New
York in 1818 called the "Medical Science Lottery," in which the brokers conducting the
lottery provided the winning numbers in advance to wealthy individuals in the hopes of
future consideration).
145 See Jonathan Gottfried, The Federal Frameworkfor Internet Gambling, 10 RICH. J.L.
& TECH. 26, 6 (2004), http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v10i3/article26.pdf (stating that by
1862, only two states, Missouri and Kentucky, had not prohibited lotteries).
146 See Phalen v. Virginia, 49 U.S. 163, 168 (1850) (construing a criminal law passed in
Virginia in 1834 that prohibited lotteries and explaining that "[e]xperience has shown that
the common forms of gambling are comparatively innocuous when placed in contrast with
the widespread pestilence of lotteries"); see also Willmann, supra note 134, at 16
(describing numerous laws prohibiting lotteries in the early 1800s as being particularly
ineffective).
147 MASON & NELSON, supra note 14, at 8.
148 See id. (discussing the Louisiana Lottery Company, which sold ninety percent of its
tickets outside Louisiana).
141 Ch. 191, 28 Stat. 963 (1895) (prohibiting interstate transportation of lottery tickets).
150 Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 363-64 (1903) (upholding the ability of the federal
government to prohibit interstate transmission of lottery tickets under the commerce clause).
Note that the Federal Anti-Lottery Act was amended in the 1970s to create an exception for
state-run lotteries. Gottfried, supra note 145, 6 (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 1307).
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enacted legislation prohibiting lotteries and most other forms of gambling,
although illegal lotteries continued.15'
During the nineteenth century, morality arguments against gambling took
center stage in the debate. Reformers pointed to gambling as an immoral
activity engaged in by flouters of the Puritan work ethic, people who wanted to
obtain something of value without contributing any work.15 2 Reformers also
used economic prudence arguments to show that gambling was an affront to
sober-minded capitalist values of savings and investment.15 3
This period also saw the emergence of both the stock market and real estate
speculation as widespread activities.15 4 Regulators were forced to walk a fine
line between moral speculation that was legal and immoral speculation that
was not. Primarily, concerns arose surrounding "bucket shops," small
storefronts that purported to offer opportunities to purchase futures contracts
on commodities.155 These shops were pure speculation shops, with the owners
having no offsetting obligations.15 6 Investors could also purchase "futures" in
the price of a stock without having an obligation to buy or sell the actual stock;
these contracts were sometimes called "difference contracts" and were similar
to betting on the price of a stock or commodity. 5 7 These shops were often
fraudulent, but they also competed with the emerging commodities
exchanges. 5 8 Through the Commodity Exchange Act, the federal government
created a monopolistic regime whereby no futures contract would be
enforceable unless it was traded on an organized exchange. 5 9 This law
required futures contracts to have an obligation of delivery, distinguishing
valid contracts from "difference contracts," which were (and are) considered to
be gambling. 160 However, virtually all futures contracts are satisfied by the
purchase of an offsetting futures contract, making the distinction illusory. 161
151 MASON & NELSON, supra note 14, at 9; see Taggart & Wilks, supra note 133, at 3
("[B]y the early 1900s, virtually all forms of legalized gambling had disappeared from the
American landscape.").
152 BARKER & BRITZ, supra note 129, at 20; see FABIAN, supra note 28, at 2-3 (repeating
reformers' arguments that gamblers undermined economic stability because, like thieves
and parasites, they sought profits while they produced nothing in return).
153 See FABIAN, supra note 28, at 4-5 (arguing that by labeling gambling as immoral and
irrational, gambling became a "negative analogue" that gave other forms of investment and
speculation credibility).
154 BARKER & BRITZ, supra note 129, at 21-22 (describing stockjobbing and land
speculation as gambling for "the wealthy and merchant classes").
155 FABIAN, supra note 28, at 189.
156 Hazen, supra note 60, at 1014.
151 Id. at 1015.
151 Id. at 1014.
151 Id. at 1017.
160 See id. at 1016-17 ("It eventually became the rule that a futures contract taking place
on a bona fide contract market does not constitute illegal gambling.")
161 See id. at 1017 (estimating that ninety percent of futures contracts are closed out with
[Vol. 86:371
2006] REGULATING PUBLIC MORALS AND PRIVATE MARKETS 397
2. Casino Games
All forms of gambling remained illegal in the United States until 1931. In
the aftermath of the stock market crash of 1929 and the economic depression
that followed, the state of Nevada turned to casino gambling to revitalize its162
economy. Contemporaneous with the federal government creating the SEC
and passing sweeping federal laws to regain investor confidence in the stock
market,1 63 Nevada legalized casino gambling in 1931.164 Would-be casino
owners paid consideration for this boon in the form of state taxes and
regulatory oversight.1 65 For over forty years, Nevada would stand alone in the
United States as the one state in which casino gambling was legal.
The modern movement to legalize casinos began in 1976 when New Jersey
legalized casino gambling in Atlantic City.166 Legislators in other states
attempted to duplicate the same legalization, but many failed.1 67 Some states
were successful. Generally, if one state was able to legalize casino gambling,
in either commercial casinos or federally regulated tribal casinos, its
neighboring states would gain useful ammunition to argue for their own
casinos. 168 A winning argument seemed to be that residents were taking their
gambling money out-of-state. 169 States established casinos not only to keep
entertainment money flowing to state businesses, but also into state coffers.
The states that legalized casino gambling struck different deals with the
casinos as to the level of state taxation of revenue; some states retained a
modest percentage while other states retained a healthy slice of the gambling
pie.170
One outgrowth of legalized casino gambling has been a surge in legalization
of electronic gaming devices, or EGDs,1 71 which are stand alone video games
offsetting contracts).
162 MASON & NELSON, supra note 14, at 29.
163 See SODERQUIST & GALBADON, supra note 17, at 12 (describing the Securities Act of
1933 as the "quintessential New Deal legislation").
164 MASON & NELSON, supra note 14, at 29.
165 See id. at 32-33 (describing the "Nevada model" of licensing, regulating, and taxing
commercial casinos).
166 Id. at 33 (explaining that an effort to legalize gambling statewide in New Jersey failed
in 1974; the 1976 legalization applied only to Atlantic City).
167 Id. at 34-35 (reporting that between 1978 and 1988, sixteen out of seventeen state
campaigns to legalize gambling failed some repeatedly).
168 Id. at 36 (theorizing that the pressure to legalize casino gambling grew in states that
were located near gambling states).
169 See id. at 37-38 (describing how riverboat casinos managed to draw citizens from
neighboring states, thus causing those states to "recapture" revenue by developing their own
riverboat casinos).
10 See Kearney, supra note 48, at 288 ("Maximum tax rates on gross gaming revenues in
American casinos range from 6.25 percent in Nevada to 35 percent in Illinois.").
171 See Bridwell & Quinn, supra note 24, at 578-82 (describing how South Carolina
came to enact the Video Game Machines Act in 1993).
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with pay out abilities. In some states, EGDs are found in non-casino
establishments, such as restaurants, bars, convenience stores, and even grocery
stores. 172 In Las Vegas, EGDs can be found in the airport. In other states with
no casino gambling, EGDs have been legalized as a less dangerous form of
gambling. 173 However, many argue that EGDs, such as video poker, are the
"crack cocaine" of gambling: dangerously addictive and hard to regulate. 174
Illegal EGDs are in operation in many states. 175
3. Lotteries
At the same time that states were legalizing casino gambling and the federal
government was allowing tribal casino gambling, states also began to
reintroduce lotteries. Unlike colonial America, states now chose to own their
lotteries and not allow private concerns to have lotteries, ensuring a
monopoly. 176 In addition, states retained all the profits, after administrative
costs and prizes, for their own coffers. 177 In 1964, New Hampshire was the
first state to re-legalize the lottery. 178 Currently, forty states and the District of
Columbia conduct lotteries. 179 Some smaller states have even joined together
to form larger lottery pools.1 0 Also, some states allow playing the lottery via
video lottery terminals (VLTs), which simulate a casino slot machine terminal,
and some states are experimenting with selling lottery tickets over the
Internet.18' Notably, no state that has legalized lotteries in the modern era has
172 See id. at 577 (stating that video gambling devices in South Carolina were in
convenience stores, bars, and truck stops).
173 See BARKER & BRITZ, supra note 129, at 11 (stating that gambling machines are
required to have a set minimum payout, unlike other casino games); Bridwell & Quinn,
supra note 24, at 568 (describing how a state with no other legalized gambling came to have
a three billion dollar EGD industry).
174 Bridwell & Quinn, supra note 24, at 692-93.
175 See id. at 613 (reporting that, in the first quarter of 2001, the illegal EGD industry in
North Carolina generated $4.2 million in wagers).
176 See Taggart & Wilks, supra note 133, at 7, 8 (reporting that, by late 2003, forty states
had legal state-run lotteries).
171 See id. at 3 (stating that, in 2002, commercial casinos in eleven states generated $25
billion in revenue, $4 billion of which went to the states).
178 Kearney, supra note 48, at 291.
179 Id.
180 In 1985, the Tri-State Lotto was formed, with Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont
participating. North American Association of State and Provincial Lotteries, Lottery
History, http://www.naspl.org/history.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2006). In 1988, Powerball
was formed by the Multi-State Lottery Association, which currently includes twenty-eight
states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Multi-State Lottery
Association Home Page, http://www.musl.com (last visited Jan. 29, 2006).
181 MASON & NELSON, supra note 14, at 23-24 (stating that Delaware, Oregon, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, and West Virginia allow VLTs even though these devices "appear to
be one of the most addictive forms of gambling"); Keamey, supra note 48, at 293 (reporting
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repealed the lottery.
4. Pari-Mutuel Betting
During the 1930s, a number of states legalized other forms of gambling,
including pari-mutuel horse racing and dog racing. 18 2 Horse races were never
prohibited, but gambling on the races was illegal in many states, although
illegal betting was rampant. 18 3 During the twentieth century, almost all states
built racetracks and legalized betting on horse races and dog races to capture
the benefit of tax revenue and perhaps intangible benefits to the local
economy. 184 However, the growth of legal casino gambling and lotteries since
1976 has forced racetracks have had to compete for gambling revenue. 18 5 To
do so, the federal government has allowed remote betting on horse racing and
dog racing. 186 In addition, some states have allowed racetracks to install
EGDs, simulcasts of races at other tracks, and some casino games. 187
5. Sports Betting
The one form of gambling that has not seen an expansion in legalization is
sports betting,1 88 although this type of gambling did experience an incredible
that California and West Virginia have recently introduced stand-alone VLTs).
182 MASON & NELSON, supra note 14, at 29 (asserting that in the 1930s, "more than
twenty state governments legalized and taxed pari-mutuel betting on horse racing as a quest
for new revenues").
183 The most popular illegal betting operation during this time would be the Irish
Sweepstakes, which ran from 1930 until 1987 and tracked the results of popular horse races.
Although this sweepstakes was run by the government of Ireland to finance hospitals, many
U.S. citizens bought tickets on the black market. See Legislation Relating to Organized
Crime: Hearings on H.R. 468, H.R. 1246, H.R. 3021, H.R. 3022, H.R. 3023, H.R. 3246,
H.R. 5230, H.R. 6571, H.R. 6572, H.R. 6909, H.R. 7039, Bills to Provide for New Federal
Criminal Statutes, Before Subcomm. Mo. 5 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong.
352 (1961) (statement of Herbert J. Miller, Jr., Criminal Division, U.S. Department of
Justice) (stating that the passage of the Wire Wager Act would make it illegal for Americans
to purchase tickets in the Irish Sweepstakes, a legal contest in Ireland).
184 See Taggart & Wilks, supra note 133, at 4 (reporting that, by late 2003, forty-three
states had legal thoroughbred gambling and forty-two states had intertrack wagering).
185 MASON & NELSON, supra note 14, at 29-30.
186 See Taggart & Wilks, supra note 133, at 4 (reporting that, by late 2003, twenty-five
states allowed off-track wagering).
187 MASON & NELSON, supra note 14, at 30.
188 See DAVIES & ABRAM, supra note I, at 2 (remarking that sports betting is one of the
"largest untapped sources of potential tax revenue in the nation"). In fact, legislators
frequently introduce bills in Congress to strengthen federal sports betting laws, especially
sports betting on amateur sports. See, e.g., Student Athlete Protection Act, H.R. 1422, 109th
Cong. (2005) (proposing to prohibit high school and college sports gambling in all states,
including the four states in which such gambling was permitted prior to 1991).
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expansion in the last half of the twentieth century. 189 After the passage of the
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act in 1992,190 sports betting is
legal only in those three states that operated legal sports gambling at that time:
Nevada, Oregon, and Delaware. 191 However, only Nevada currently has a
vigorous legal sports betting industry, and Oregon has a more limited
variety.192 Sports betting is also the one form of non-tribal gambling that has
attracted the attention of the federal government. Unlike other forms of
gaming, such as poker, blackjack, or slot machines, sports betting is a type of
gambling that is conducive to remote participation. Participating in a casino
game over the telephone is inconceivable, but placing a sports bet in the course
of a telephone conversation has been practical for some time. In 1961,
Congress passed the Wire Communications Act, or the "Wire Act," in response
to concerns that gamblers in states outside of Nevada were placing sports bets
to Nevada bookies over the telephone. 193 The Wire Act prohibits the use of
"wire communications" to place a bet or wager on a sporting event or
contest. 194
Although exact figures for the number of illegal bets and amounts wagered
are impossible to calculate, the National Gambling Impact Study Commission
estimated that illegal sports betting in the United States could be a $380 billion
industry. 195 From March Madness office pools to Fantasy Sports to Super
Bowl parties, sports betting is fairly ubiquitous in daily American life.
Although generally illegal outside of Nevada, many newspapers publish the
"Las Vegas line" and give details of injury reports to aid gamblers. 196 Of
189 See DAVIES & ABRAM, supra note 1, at 145 (describing a 1986 Sports Illustrated
article reporting that bookies who had once received mostly horse racing wagers now
manage sports bets almost exclusively).
90 Pub. L. 102-559, 106 Stat. 4227 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 3701 (2004)).
"' 28 U.S.C. § 3704(a)(1).
192 Oregon Lottery Sports Action, http://www.oregonlottery.org/sports (last visited
Apr. 12, 2006); see Ari Weinberg, The Case for Legal Sports Gambling, Jan. 27, 2003,
FORBES.COM, http://www.forbes.com/2003/01/27/cx aw I127gambling.html (explaining
the operation of Oregon's Sports Action, a weekly football lottery game).
193 Wire Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2000) (setting forth penalties for the
transmission of wagering information); H.R. REP. No. 87-967, at 1 (1961), as reprinted in
1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2631-32 (stating that modem day bookmaking was dependent on
telephone service for both the making of wagers and the transmission of sports results, and
that preventing the transmission of this information would suppress organized gambling
activities).
19' Id. § 1084(a):
Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering knowingly uses a wire
communication facility for the transmission ... of bets or wagers ... on any sporting
event or contest ... shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two
years or both.
195 NGISC REPORT, supra note 15, at 2-14 (describing sports betting as "the most
widespread and popular form of gambling in America").
196 DAVIES & ABRAM, supra note 1, at 146.
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course, Nevada sports betting is also a large industry, attracting many amateur
and professional sports gamblers during popular sporting events. 197
Notwithstanding the regulatory stagnation of legalized sports betting, at
present, the United States has more forms of legalized gambling than in any
time in over 100 years. 198 In light of this unprecedented wave of liberalization,
the outcry of both the federal government and the state governments to the
prospect of Internet gambling is both incongruous and troubling, as discussed
in Part V.
B. Current Securities Regulation Environment
Two years after Nevada legalized casino gambling, Congress passed the first
federal securities law, the Securities Act of 1933.199 States had previously
regulated the sales of securities under so-called "blue-sky" laws. 200 However,
the federal government's approach to regulation of publicly-held companies
was that these companies would disclose certain information to investors at
certain intervals.20 1 If the material proved later to have been false in a material
respect, then the company could face civil and, to a lesser extent, criminal
penalties. 20 2 The federal government specifically chose not to examine the
merit of the underlying investment.20 3 Even after the most recent increases to
federal regulation under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,204 this form-over-
substance approach remains intact. Although new disclosure requirements
have increased transaction costs for offering common stock to the public and
for maintaining the status of publicly-held corporations, 20 5 the availability of
197 See id. at 2-3 (mentioning tourists' bets placed on the Super Bowl during a visit to
Las Vegas).
198 See Taggart & Wilks, supra note 133, at 4 ("For the vast majority of states, however,
the tendency has been to expand, sometimes quite significantly, the permissiveness of state
laws governing gambling activities.").
199 Ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933).
200 Hazen, supra note 60, at 1014 (explaining that blue-sky laws began to appear in
1911). Black's Law Dictionary defines "blue-sky law" as "[a] state statute establishing
standards for offering and selling securities, the purpose being to protect citizens from
investing in fraudulent schemes or unsuitable companies." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 183
(8th ed. 2004).
201 See generally CARL W. SCHNEIDER, Now THAT You ARE PUBLICLY OWNED... (Nancy
Jean Fulop Short ed., 2002) (describing the various reporting and disclosure obligations
under federal securities law).
202 See id. at 27-33 (discussing disclosure requirements generally).
203 SODERQUIST & GALBADON, supra note 17, at 12 (detailing how the first draft of the
Securities Act reflected "merit regulation" and was rejected by President Franklin
Roosevelt); Hazen, supra note 4, at 382 (describing that, in drafting the Securities Act,
Congress "debated but rejected a merit approach to regulation that would examine the
substance of the investment product being offered and sold").
204 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
205 See generally Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate
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legal investing opportunities for individuals has never been greater. Besides
being able to own stock in a corporation, investors are also able to purchase an
almost infinite variety of options, limited only by the option writer's
imagination.20 6  Also, since the passage of the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act of 2000,207 investors can purchase over-the-counter future
contracts on almost anything.20 8
C. Historical Arguments for Distinguishing Capitalistic Speculation from
Gaming Speculation
Some commentators have argued that historical suspicion of gambling is, at
best, paternalistic and, at worst, classist. 20 9 Gambling has been blamed for
social problems ranging from personal tragedies, such as addiction, divorce,
bankruptcy, and domestic abuse, to public ills, such as crime and welfare
burdens. 210 Arguments against gambling may focus on the immorality of
either striving to achieve something without earning it or worshiping luck and
therefore straying from monotheistic Judeo-Christian teachings. 211  Other
arguments focus on the added social costs, 212 even of gambling activities that
are touted as bringing revenue to the state and prosperity to the community.2 13
State-sponsored lotteries have also been condemned for being a regressive tax
Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1 (2002).
206 See HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 117, at 555 (describing the many types of
derivatives that can be formed in entities that hold mortgages).
207 Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1).
208 See Hazen, supra note 4, at 389-90 (comparing the pre-Act futures markets to
gambling casinos that have a state-granted monopoly on a particular wagering product).
209 See, e.g., BARKER & BRITZ, supra note 129, at 22 (stating that gambling laws were
directed at lower class activities such as public gambling and lotteries); FABIAN, supra note
28, at 12-13 (analyzing gambling restrictions designed to regulate the behavior of the poor
while ignoring private bets among the wealthy); Hazen, supra note 4, at 396-97 (comparing
paternalistic regulation of securities and gambling).
210 See John D. Andrle, Note, A Winning Hand: A Proposal for an International
Regulatory Schema with Respect to the Growing Online Gambling Dilemma in the U.S., 37
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1389, 1392 (2004) (estimating societal costs of all gambling to be
five billion dollars a year).
211 See GILMORE, supra note 10, at 30 (arguing against the "contention that the only
wealth worthily gained and retained is that earned by hard labour").
212 See Kearney, supra note 48, at 281 (citing a 2004 Gallup poll finding that two-thirds
of Americans had gambled in the last twelve months, and a 2003 Gallup poll finding that
fifty percent of Americans had bought a lottery ticket in the last twelve months).
213 See id. at 286-87 (citing a 2004 study that estimated the net cost of a casino as
seventy-five dollars per adult resident). Although pro-gambling legislators tout additional
tax revenue from lotteries and casinos, empirical evidence so far does not show economic
growth from some casinos, such as riverboat casinos frequented by daytrippers who do not
patronize local businesses. Id. at 286. In addition, state lotteries and casinos may
cannibalize revenue from each other and from other local entertainment options. Id.
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because taxpayers in lower tax brackets "pay" a proportionately higher tax,
even though taxpayers in different income groups gamble an equal amount of
money.2 14 Although research shows that lottery ticket buyers represent all
"races, sexes, and income and education groups," that research does show
differences in the types of lottery products that residents of lower-income,
middle-income, and higher-income zip codes purchase. 215
However, disdain for gambling may also be less civic-minded. Gambling
threatens social order; in the throw of the dice, a commoner can become a
wealthy citizen,216 a slave a freedman. 217 Gambling is anathema to the Puritan
work ethic, but it also violates unspoken values of knowing one's place and
living within one's class. In addition, historically, financial speculation was
engaged in by the elite; therefore, it was respectable. Gaming speculation,
especially as engaged in by the poorer classes, was frowned upon and at times
prohibited.2 1 8 In fact, the first anti-gaming statute in England applied only to a
"servant of husbandry, . . . labourer .... servant .... artificer .... [or]
victualler. '219 Horse racing provides another example of classist regulation.
Historically, trackside wagering was a legal activity for the wealthy who could
afford entry fees; however, off-track betting on the same race in the same town
by the working classes was illegal. 220
Moralistic arguments against gambling may also have been spurred by
proponents of the nascent banking and securities industry. As disposable
income was scarce, gambling competed with other speculation activities, such
as savings and investments.221  Historians have theorized that powerful
individuals may have wanted to protect the financial arenas that they
controlled.222
214 See id. at 292-93 (finding that "state lottery products are disproportionately consumed
by the poor").
215 Id. at 292 (asserting that average annual lottery spending is roughly equal among
socioeconomic groups but that low-income lottery players focus on instant games with
worse odds than jackpot lotteries, making lotteries more regressive than previously thought).
Lottery opponents also argue that African-Americans gamble away more money in lotteries
than other Americans. In 1998, a study found that black respondents spent almost twice as
much on lottery tickets than white and Hispanic respondents. Jd.
216 See Statman, supra note 40, at 20 (arguing that one motivation to restrain gamblers
stems from the "envy of the upstart and a desire of the ruling elite to keep its high relative
position in society").
217 See BARKER& BRITZ, supra note 129, at 22 (giving as one example Denmark Vesley,
who bought his freedom with his $1,500 gambling winnings).
218 Id.
219 Bridwell & Quinn, supra note 24, at 622-23 (citing 12 Rich. 1i c. VI (1388) (Eng.)).
220 DAVIES & ABRAM, supra note 1, at 16 (describing how legislators prohibited
"poolrooms" where less affluent bettors could place bets through telegraph lines without
having to pay admission or transportation fees).
221 FABIAN, supra note 28, at 50-51.
222 See Statman, supra note 40, at 19-20.
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III. COMPARING APPLES TO APPLES: REGULATING SPECULATION ACTIVITIES
BASED ON CHANCE, SKILL, AND UTILITY
Leaving aside both ends of the spectrum,223 which are purely activities of
chance, regulated as gambling, and activities of skill, regulated, if at all, as
economic enterprises, the groupings within the spectrum should be regulated
similarly. Activities within these groups have similar levels of chance and
skill, as well as similar levels of utility, entertainment value, and social costs.
Therefore, a coherent system of regulation would treat these groups similarly.
A. Type A Speculation
Type A speculation activities, including blackjack, poker, derivatives, and
day trading, have dramatic differences in the level of regulation that each
inspires, although the activities have similar levels of positive utility and social
costs. Blackjack and poker are strictly regulated, even prohibited in a majority
of states, along with other types of casino gambling. 224 On the other hand,
sellers of derivative products have enjoyed recent liberalization of rules
restricting sales of futures contracts to the exchanges supervised by the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission.225 Investors have nearly unfettered
ability to purchase derivatives on almost any financial product or other
benchmark.226 In addition, although the SEC approved two new National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) rules in the aftermath of the 2001
dot-com bust to protect "pattern day traders,"227 day trading is virtually as
encouraged by the SEC as any other kind of stock trading. Any individual can
boot up a computer and, with a credit card, legally become a day trader in a
matter of minutes.
These activities should be regulated similarly. Day trading and investing in
derivatives have all the hallmarks of skill-based gambling activities like
blackjack and poker and also have all the negative social costs associated with
these activities. As easily as someone could lose money and become addicted
to poker, someone else could lose money and become addicted to day trading
or speculating on exotic derivative instruments. 228 Just as there are cautionary
223 See Figure 1, supra, Part I.A.
224 See MASON & NELSON, supra note 14, at 37, 62-63 (commenting that only eleven
states allow commercial casinos, although twenty-four states allow tribal casinos).
225 Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763
(2000) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1).
226 Prior to the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, large markets for exotic
financial derivatives were conducted off-exchange. Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates
Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE
L.J. 701, 764 (1999).
227 See 66 Fed. Reg. 13608, 13609 (Mar. 6, 2001) (defining "pattern day trader" as
someone who buys and sells - or sells short and then buys - the same stock within one day
and does this four or more times in five consecutive business days).
228 According to Professors Hamilton and Booth, "[a]bout 90 percent of all individual
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tales of bright people ruining their lives by playing poker,229 tales abound of
bright people losing their nest eggs by actively trading. In fact, corporations
full of bright people have lost corporate nest eggs by purchasing derivatives
that were not understood.2 30
If governments are concerned enough about the first group of compulsive
gamblers to prohibit casino gambling and similar types of games, then concern
for compulsive investors should result in the same prohibition against market
speculation. Conversely, if governments want to assume that rational investors
should be free to control their own destiny in the capital markets, then
gamblers should be granted the same autonomy.
B. Type B Speculation
Sports betting and stock trading, Type B speculation, also represent a
departure in the regulation of speculation. As discussed previously, sports
betting is the most prohibited type of gambling in the United States, although
arguably the most prevalent. Stock trading, however, is generally encouraged
in all U.S. jurisdictions. Both activities provide a similar type of entertainment
value, a similar indirect economic utility, and similar social costs, and thus
they should be regulated similarly.
Both stock trading and sports betting are enormously interesting activities.
Their existence spawns an interest in the underlying industry, whether it is a
particular sport or team or a particular industry or company. They also spawn
economic activity in the underlying industry. The existence of a gambling
market sells sports tickets, pay-per-view programming, sports programming,
sports magazines, and fantasy sports league fees.232 Likewise, the existence of
a secondary trading market encourages original investment in corporations
through the promise of a market for common stock.233  However, both
gambling and stock trading have internal and external costs. For both the
compulsive gambler and trader, losses may be substantial, and we know that
the average speculator in these activities loses money. In addition, these
activities have external costs. Gambling may harm an industry by creating
commodity speculators lose money ...." HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 65, at 426.
229 See Daniel G. Habib, Online and Obsessed, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 30, 2005, at
66 (telling the story of one college student who owed $55,000 in gambling debts, even
though his father had paid off his gambling debts once previously).
211 MALKIEL, supra note 72, at 290 (retelling the story of how Proctor & Gamble lost
$100 million on a foreign interest rate derivative); see The Proctor & Gamble Co. v.
Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270, 1292 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (denying most claims of P&G
against its counterpart in a risky foreign interest rate derivative).
231 See supra Part I.D.1.
232 ROSE & OWENS, supra note 33, at 44-45 (predicting that because ESPN and other
"media giants" benefit from fantasy leagues, enforcement of sports betting laws in this area
will be infrequent).
233 SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supra note 17, at 26-27. Companies issuing stock also
gain the ability to pay executives and other employees in stock. Id. at 27.
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scandals. 234 Irrational trading may bring inefficiencies to the market, causing
the market to fail in its function of providing accurate price information. In
nightmare scenarios, managers of pension funds may create almost limitless
negative effects on various groups through reckless trading. 235
If sports betting is sinister enough to the participants and the sport to be
banned in almost every state and the District of Columbia,236 then stock trading
should also be banned. Conversely, if stock trading provides enough utility to
the market not only to permit it but to encourage it, then sports betting should
be deregulated. Regulation should not prefer a vehicle that primarily confers
benefits on highly educated, wealthy financial intermediaries to a vehicle that
primarily confers benefits on perhaps less-educated, but often just as wealthy
bookmakers and casinos.
C. Insider Speculation: Sure Bets
Although the arguments for decriminalizing insider trading237 are outside the
scope of this article, the securities industry may be able to learn from the sports
industry, which has adopted a policy that allowing insiders to gamble on their
own sport skews motivations and sullies the game. Perhaps this policy could
inform whether insiders should own shares in their own companies, whether
insiders should own stock options, and whether insiders should be required to
announce stock sales before rather than after execution of the sale. However,
the sports industry might be able to learn about incentive compensation and
decide that allowing players to bet on their own team's success would motivate
players and keep them in the game.238
IV. REGULATING FOR THE OUTLIER: THE RECKLESS GAMBLER AND THE
RECKLESS INVESTOR
A. Caveat Speculator
To attempt to understand why gambling has historically been restricted
234 See DAVIES & ABRAM, supra note 1, at 23 (retelling the fabled story of the 1919
Black Sox scandal).
235 See Mary Williams Walsh, How Wall Street Wrecked United's Pension, N.Y. TIMES,
July 31, 2005, § 3, at 1 (describing how United Airlines' risky portfolio contributed to its
underfunding and resulting bailout by the Pension Benefits Guaranty Corporation).
236 NGISC REPORT, supra note 15, at 2-14.
237 See generally Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness, Efficiency, and Insider Trading:
Deconstructing the Coin of the Realm in the Information Age, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 443
(2001).
238 However, this seemingly innocuous allowance could create conflicts of interest on the
margin due to the nature of sports bets. The 1958 Super Bowl win by the Colts is marred by
the suspicion that the owner called for a last-minute touchdown play, instead of a less risky
field goal, because he had bet that the Colts would beat the line. DAVIES & ABRAM, supra
note 1, at 97-99.
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while similar investment activities have not, comparing regulators' views of
the participants, not the activity, may be helpful. Interestingly, although both
the securities industry and the gambling industry acknowledge that certain
individuals may be susceptible to dangerous behavior in both arenas, the
securities regulatory regime assumes a "rational speculator. '239 However,
many U.S. jurisdictions that outlaw or restrict gambling assume an irrational
speculator who should be protected from behavioral biases. 240 In contrast,
securities law policies reflect a regulatory approach based on the premise that
investors are rational actors who make informed choices.
To ensure consumer protection in both industries, regulators assume that
participants rationally analyze all known facts and so focus on policing
whether the facts known to the actors are true. Public companies disclose
financial statements, and the SEC has enforcement mechanisms in place to
provide comfort that those statements are true in all material respects.
Similarly, casinos offer games of chance, and regulators have monitoring
mechanisms in place to ensure that those games are operating according to the
laws of chance and are not fraudulently modified. However, securities
regulators ignore or only give passing acknowledgment of the speculator who
makes decisions in spite of known facts, although legislators seem sensitive to
the irrational gambler.
B. The Sympathetic Speculator: Profiling the Herd
In legal scholarship, scholars have recently begun to challenge the law's
assumption that all industry actors, including actors in the securities industry,
act rationally given all known information. These scholars challenge "rational
choice theory" with "behavioral economics theory," positing that individuals
act according to certain behavioral biases that conflict with rational decision
making.241  These behavioral biases, described in the context of how
individuals make decisions given uncertain outcomes, are equally as apparent
in the behavior of gamblers as investors, thus providing further argument that
the two activities should be regulated similarly. Recognition of behavioral
biases does not then demand either the prohibition of securities trading or
gambling. However, acknowledging these factors may assist in harmonizing
239 See Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, and the Law, 97 Nw. U. L. REV.
1115, 1149 (2003) ("Recognizing that investing in securities is fraught with risk and
uncertainty, cognitive psychologists and behavioral economists have raised formidable
challenges to the long-dominant assumption that investors, investment managers, and
brokers behave rationally.").
240 See ROSE & OWENS, supra note 33, at 122-41 (showing how the classification of
"pathological gambling" as a mental disorder has influenced state legislation and tort causes
of action).
241 Guthrie, supra note 239, at 1149 (commenting that scholars have begun to draw upon
"cognitive psychology to analyze securities markets, securities disputes, and securities
regulation").
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these regimes. Although scholars have hesitated to conclude that these
theories should reform the regulation of markets based on rational actors, these
theories do offer interesting explanations of anomalies in earlier
assumptions. 242
1. Prospect Theory
Both investors and gamblers tend to make decisions on wagers based on
prospect theory, the theory that investors will accept more risk to avoid a loss
than to achieve a gain.243 The typical example of this "bird in the hand" theory
is that investors would choose to receive $1,000 over a fifty percent chance at a
$2,000 pot.2 44 But, the same investor would accept a "double or nothing" bet
of accepting a fifty percent chance of paying a $2,000 fine instead of paying a
$1,000 fine now.245 Each of these options has the same economic value of
$1,000, but an investor will "irrationally" choose one option over another
based on whether the decision is framed as the prospect of gain or the
avoidance of a loss. Therefore, to avoid ending a gambling session at a loss, a
speculator may be willing to take on more risk.246 Similarly, an investor may
wait longer to sell a stock, in hopes of avoiding recognizing a built-in loss. 2 4 7
In addition, both investors and gamblers may consider a wager to be a loss-
avoiding tactic, even if the loss to be avoided is not an actual out-of-pocket
loss but a downward deviation from a psychological baseline. 248 Therefore, if
an investor believes that she is behind on saving for retirement, she may take
on more risk to avoid falling behind on that goal.249 An investor may also
measure a baseline as relative to how much others have profited from the
markets. 250
A corollary to prospect theory, and one that is highly applicable to both
investing and gambling, is that this preference tends to reverse when the
242 See Langevoort, supra note 69, at 138-39 (proposing the inclusion of behavioral
theory as a factor in thinking about securities law).
243 See Guthrie, supra note 239, at 1150 (discussing the prospect theory as it applies to
investor behavior).
244 Id. at 1118 (building on research by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky on decision
making).
245 Id.
246 REBER, supra note 37, at 357 (discussing the gambler's temptation to make high risk
wagers to end the day in the black and how horse racetracks take advantage of this by
having high risk wagers on the last race).
247 Langevoort, supra note 69, at 144.
248 Guthrie, supra note 239, at 1149-50.
249 Id.
250 Langevoort, supra note 11, at 638-39 (providing as an example an investor who
believes that she has not capitalized on a bull market after hearing of other's profits and who
consequently wants to regain lost ground).
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probabilities get increasingly smaller.251 In both speculative investing and
gambling, the probabilities are small and the gains are large.252 So, a gambler
will choose to forego a small amount of money for a small probability of a
large gain. A gambler will choose not to accept one dollar, but instead a one
percent chance of a $100 pot, even though these options have the same
economic value. However, someone would choose to pay one dollar to avoid a
one percent chance of paying a $100 fine. Thus prospect theory explains both
why gamblers choose to buy cheap lottery tickets and why investors purchase
stock options.
2. House Money
Related to prospect theory is the theory that investors and gamblers will be
more willing to take risks with "found money" or "house money. '253 If
prospect theory tells us that speculators value more strongly money that they
already possess, then speculators will place less value on and take greater risks
with investment profits and gambling winnings. Unfortunately, this bias may
also affect securities professionals who manage other people's money.254
3. Speculator Overconfidence
Although statistics tell both investors and gamblers that the average
speculator will lose money betting on sports, playing blackjack, playing "L"
games, buying derivatives, or trading in stocks, individual speculators believe
that they can succeed in these lopsided endeavors. Part of the popularity of
these games may be due to overconfidence of players and the tendency of most
players to assume that they are more skilled than the average player.255
Professor Stout has described these markets as "Lake Wobegon" markets,
where all speculators believe their skills are above average. 256 In fact, the great
majority of active traders will label themselves as "above average" compared
251 Guthrie, supra note 239, at 1118.
252 For example, on August 3, 2005, an investor could purchase an option to buy
common stock in Krispy Kreme Doughnuts, Inc. (KKD) for five cents with an exercise price
of ten dollars that expires on August 3 1. The probabilities of the stock increasing to over
ten dollars from $7.71 in twenty-eight days are quite low considering that KKD's stock
price has been lower than ten dollars since January 4, 2005. However, should the stock rise
to eleven dollars, a fifty dollar wager would yield a $1,000 return.
253 See REBER, supra note 37, at 349 (describing illogical betting systems that encourage
gamblers to increase bets after winning because gamblers are now betting with the casino's
money).
254 See Langevoort, supra note 11, at 643-45 (hypothesizing that managers' structural
incentives probably lessen the effect of behavioral biases but observing that these managers
do seem to be susceptible to both prospect theory and overconfidence).
255 SHEFRIN, supra note 113, at 48.
256 Stout, supra note 12, at 637.
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to other traders. 257 In addition, volumes of literature on how to beat both the
stock market and the casinos perpetuate this myth of control over mathematical
odds, and both gambling professionals and securities professionals market
"systems" that purport to beat the odds.258 Moreover, the mere accessibility
and abundance of information on markets may also give speculators an
irrational sense of confidence.259
4. Illusion of Control
Related to overconfidence bias is the illusion of control. In some games,
such as craps, where the player physically controls the operation of chance by
throwing the dice, players are more susceptible to this illusion that the player is
in control of the game. 260 Day traders who can trade directly through an
Electronic Communications Network may also believe they wield more control
than traders acting through intermediaries. 261 This illusion may also encourage
traders to trade more frequently. 262
5. Representation
One aspect of representation bias is simply that the recent occurrence of
random events affects a person's belief in the likelihood of that event
happening again.263 For example, when a particular convenience store sells the
"winning ticket," other lottery players will flock to that location the next
week.264 Likewise, media coverage of recent initial public offerings in a
257 Langevoort, supra note 69, at 146.
258 See generally, e.g., GERALD APPEL, WINNING MARKET SYSTEMS: 83 WAYS TO BEAT
THE MARKET (1997) (teaching various systems for stock trading); MARTEN JENSEN, BEAT
THE SLOTS: LEARN THE INSIDE SECRETS OF BEATING TODAY'S NEW MACHINES (2002) (on file
with author) (capitalizing on gamblers' overconfidence by promising that "by learning about
the games and by using a methodical approach, you are much more likely to come out ahead
than those poor, unenlightened amateurs"). Through technological advances, investors can
not only buy books that explain stock trading systems, but they can also buy software
marketed as investment training software. Bradley, supra note 70, at 3 10-11.
259 See Langevoort, supra note 69, at 154 (contending that the emergence of the Internet
in the 1990s brought about an "explosion in web-based investment information" that
"operated as a substitute for brokerage firm guidance, supporting (if not inflating) the sense
of confidence for the real investor").
260 See REBER, supra note 37, at 64 (suggesting that craps is tempting because it is the
only Type L game in which the wagerer plays a part in the outcome by throwing the dice).
261 See SHEFRIN, supra note 113, at 133 (stating that this heuristic is "especially acute
when it comes to online trading, Internet stocks, and day trading").
262 Id.
263 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1125 (1974).
264 Kearney, supra note 48, at 294 (finding that retailers in Texas between 2000 and 2002
experienced sales increases of between twelve and thirty-eight percent during the week
following sales of winning tickets in those same stores).
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certain industry with big first-day stock price increases attract retail investors
to the next IPO of a firm in that industry. 265
V. REGULATING INTERNET SPECULATION
Historically, retail participation in the stock market and organized gambling
were limited by natural transaction barriers. To invest in the stock market, an
investor had to locate a broker who would make the trade for them, charge
them a commission, and require a minimum balance to open an account.
Information on publicly-traded companies was not widely available beyond
stock price information published in the newspapers of larger cities. Both to
obtain investment information and to buy or sell stock, a retail investor had to
encounter an intermediary the broker along the way. Likewise, access to
casino gambling was limited by geographical restraints. Even organized
gambling in sporting events required locating a bookmaker. With the advent
of computers, cable television, and the Internet, would-be investors and
gamblers have round-the-clock access to both participation and information.
Via online brokerage houses,266 investors can buy and sell stock over the
Internet at discounted fees at any time of day without going through an
intermediary. Reckless investors whose trading strategies may have been
tempered by the transaction costs of trading are now freer to actively manage
their own portfolios in the privacy of their own homes. Likewise, gamblers
may visit online casinos and place wagers from their homes, workplaces, or
favorite coffeeshops. Occasional vacationers to Atlantic City or Las Vegas can
now gamble online without travel costs, and amateur players intimidated by
the strange customs of the gaming tables can learn blackjack anonymously.
Generally, the SEC has applauded the destruction of barriers between retail
investors and the capital markets. 267 However, the federal government has not
been as welcoming of online gambling.
268
A. Embracing Online Trading
In 1984, the SEC acknowledged that computer brokerage systems were
being developed and that the contact between brokers and investors would be
narrowed. 269 Over the next fifteen years, brokerage systems evolved from
investors trading by telephone in established accounts to investors establishing
265 See SHEFRIN, supra note 113, at 240-43 (studying the effect of the widely publicized
1993 IPO of Discovery Zone, which resulted in a 61 percent profit on the first day, on the
subsequent IPO of Boston Chicken, a company whose stock increased 142.5 percent the
first day but which eventually declared bankruptcy).
266 See id. at 133 (describing Merrill Lynch's surrender to online trading on June 1, 1999,
as a monumental event).
267 See infra Part V.A.
268 See infra Part V.B.
269 Computer Brokerage Systems, Exchange Act Release No. 21,383, 31 SEC Docket
611 (Oct. 9, 1984).
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accounts through home computers and trading online within minutes. By
2000, online trading accounted for twenty to twenty-five percent of all stock
trading,270 and by 2001, more than 100 online trading firms were in
operation.271 The rise of the online investor spawned a new industry devoted
to delivering financial and industry information on publicly-held companies in
speedier formats such as cable television and Internet websites. 272 Technology
also allowed some firms to offer active trading clients direct access to markets
through Electronic Communications Networks (ECNs) at their locations. 273
Although the overall utility of online trading to the investor was negative,
the SEC viewed Internet trading as merely stock trading over the Internet, to be
regulated the same way as traditional stock trading.274 Notwithstanding
evidence that online trading "contributed to a nontrivial reduction in market
efficiency, '275 the SEC continued to regulate as if all investors, whether online
or under the supervision of a trusted financial advisor, acted rationally given all
known information. Even though SEC officials have conceded that the stock
market is for stock holding, not for stock trading,276 the SEC has generally
never restricted stock trading. Although we might not expect the SEC to
regulate to protect a subset of investors, negative external effects of online
trading such as price bubbles and price anomalies have also not effected
changes in securities laws.
Online investing can also be described as being specifically tailored to take
advantage of an overly confident investor. 277 Mirroring the ways in which
270 Donald C. Langevoort, Technological Evolution and the Devolution of Corporate
Financial Reporting, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 7 (2004) ("some twenty percent"); Levitt,
supra note 68, at 1095 ("twenty-five percent").
271 Matthew J. Benson, Note, Online Investing and the Suitability Obligations of Brokers
and Broker-Dealers, 34 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 395, 396 (2001).
272 See Bradley, supra note 70, at 309 ("Investors can now obtain information about
investments and investment strategies through print and broadcast media, in person through
investment seminars, and online through financial portals, broker-dealer web sites, and chat
rooms.").
273 See Bradley, supra note 71, at 68-69 (describing the differences between ordinary
online traders and day traders who blur the line between being a client of a day trading firm
and an employee or principal).
274 However, the SEC did approve NASD rulemaking requiring detailed risk disclosures
to day trading clients. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Opening of
Day-Trading Accounts, 65 Fed. Reg. 44,082, 44,083 n.9 (July 17, 2000). The next year,
NASD also passed new Rule 2520, requiring "pattern day traders" to maintain $25,000 in
their day trading account and not trade more than four times the excess amount in a day.
Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Margin Requirements for Day
Trading, 66 Fed. Reg. 13,608, 13,609 (Mar. 6, 2001).
275 Langevoort, supra note 270, at 9.
276 Levitt, supra note 69, at 1096 ("As far as I am concerned, for most individuals, the
stock market is best used for investing, not trading.").
277 See id. at 1096 (warning that unsophisticated investors may be "seduced by the ease
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casinos alter the experience to entice gamblers, issuers learned how to time
financial disclosures and spin them to "a more emotional, less sophisticated
audience. 2 78 Online trading may create a corresponding incentive for issuers
to focus on short-term financial benchmarks that play well with the day trading
crowd.279 In addition, complementary products to online investing, such as
web-based information and training software, may take advantage of investors'
vulnerabilities by enticing them to make decisions from bits of information
amassed in a non-linear format.2 80 Finally, online brokerage advertising has
received criticism, but not regulation, for seeming to promise independent
wealth to every trader, being compared in this regard to lottery
advertisements. 281
Compared to traditional arguments against gambling, official stances on
investing have steered away from acknowledging that the capital markets are
dangerous to the retail investor or that the participation by retail investors in
the capital markets has negative external effects. 282 The SEC has embraced the
vision of retail investor participation, 283 a dream that is lucrative for financial
intermediaries and psychologically satisfying for the American people. To
restrict retail investor access to the capital markets based a technological
medium2 84 would require a policy articulation that is unpalatable. Instead,
technological advances such as online investing have merely prompted
and speed of Internet trading").
278 Langevoort, supra note 270, at 9-10.
279 Id. at 16.
280 See Bradley, supra note 70, at 314 (quoting "cyberpsychologists" Luciano Gamberini
and Stefano Bussolon, who "suggest using the Internet to obtain information may promote
'nonlinearity in the exploration of knowledge' and 'communication via impressions rather
than logical connections').
281 See Levitt, supra note 68, at 1099 (criticizing these ads for creating unrealistic
expectations in online traders); see also Benson, supra note 271, at 395 (describing one
brokerage's ad featuring a fictional former tow-truck driver who, through the magic of
online trading, came to own his own island).
282 See Langevoort, supra note 69, at 173-74 (acknowledging that regulation that
distinguishes between unsophisticated traders and the financially "savvy" would be
"impossible to advocate openly").
283 See id. at 173 (referring to this democratization dream as a "myth-story" in which
rational investors are only constrained by a lack of access to information, thus shifting the
focus of regulation to information disclosure).
284 The SEC does restrict investor participation in some instances. For example, to be
exempt from registration under a Regulation D offering, the SEC requires that investors
have sufficient resources to bear any ensuing loss. Distinguishing between accredited and
non-accredited investors, the SEC presumes, but does not confirm, that these high net worth
accredited investors -primarily institutional investors and individuals with a net worth over
one million dollars - have "such knowledge and experience in financial and business
matters that [they are] capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective
investment." 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501(a), 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (2006).
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reminders from the SEC that investors be more aware of their individual
responsibility. 285
B. Exiling Online Gambling
The federal government, which has traditionally left the regulation of
gambling to the individual states, has taken the position that Internet gambling
is illegal under federal law286 under the Wire Act, which prohibits the use of a
"wire communication facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign
commerce of bets or wagers ... on any sporting event or contest. '287 The
ambiguities that surround the federal government's use of the Wire Act to
indict remote gaming sites arise in the interpretation of "wire communication
facility" and "sporting event or contest. '288 Currently, the federal government
has taken the position in prosecutions that the Wire Act covers all illegal
gaming, not just sports betting, 289 and that the Wire Act governs all Internet
gambling, even wireless use.290 Most recently, one federal court has disagreed.
285 See Levitt, supra note 68, at 1096 ("Specifically, an individual investor has a duty to
understand and control the level of risk she is assuming.").
286 Unlavifid Internet Gambling Funding Prohibition Act and the Internet Gambling
Licensing and Regulation Commission Act: Hearing on H.R. 21 and H.R. 1223 Before the
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
108th Cong. 8-12 (2003) [hereinafter "2003 Hearing on H.R. 21 & H.R. 1223"] (statement
of John G. Malcolm, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Division, U.S. Department of
Justice) (reporting that the DOJ "has concerns" about the feasibility of regulating Internet
gambling as proposed in H.R. 1223, and that the DOJ believed that Internet gambling
should be prohibited and not regulated).
287 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2000 & Supp. 2004); see also Joseph V. DeMarco, Gambling
Against Enforcement Internet Sports Books and the Wire Wager Act, U.S. ATT'YS BULL.,
Mar. 2001, at 33, 33 (explaining how the Wire Act applies equally to web-based
bookmakers and "traditional 'pay-phone' bookies").
218 See 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (2000 & Supp. 2004).
289 Compare Proposals to Regulate Illegal Internet Gambling: Hearing on Proposals to
Regulate Illegal Internet Gambling, Including S. 627, to Prevent the Use of Certain
Payments Instruments, Credit Cards, and Fund Transfers for Unlawful Internet Gambling:
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 8 (2003)
(statement of John G. Malcolm, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Division, U.S.
Department of Justice) (claiming that any business that accepts any kind of bet or wager
from customers located in the United States violates the Wire Act) with Internet Gambling
Prohibition Act of 1997: Hearings on H.R. 2380 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 81 (1998) (statement of Kevin V. DiGregory, Deputy
Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice) (conceding that the
Wire Act "may relate only to sports betting and not to the type of real-time interactive
gambling (e.g., poker) that the Internet now makes possible for the first time").
290 See Letter from Jon P. Jennings, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., Department of Justice,
to Patrick J. Leahy, Ranking Minority Member, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate (June
9, 1999), http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/s6921tr.htm (stating that the Internet
constitutes a "wire communications facility" even though it may travel over microwaves or
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In a civil action against credit card companies, the Fifth Circuit reasoned in
dicta that the Wire Act does not apply to non-sports gaming over the Internet,
such as online casinos.291 The U.S. government has taken the position that
Internet gambling takes place both in the jurisdiction in which the gambler
resides and in the jurisdiction that hosts the website. 292 Therefore, if a U.S.
resident gambles on an offshore website, then the act is illegal under both state
and federal law.
The flourishing of Internet gaming has been aided by the fact that the U.S.
stance against Internet gambling is not a global one. Other countries have
legalized Internet gambling and license companies to run gambling
websites. 293 Since 1995, many Internet sites have been created that offer
players the ability to make wagers on simulated casino games, multi-player
games such as poker, and even sports outcomes.294 Currently more than 1,800
websites are in existence, 295 and these websites generated approximately $7.4
billion in revenue in 2004.296 These websites, of course, are accessible by
citizens in other countries, including the United States, where residents
constitute sixty to seventy percent of online gamblers. 297 The owners of these
websites, however, are not available to the U.S. government for prosecution.
Although some of these websites are characterized by opponents of online
satellites because wire and cable "aid in the transmission of data between 'the points of
origin and reception of such transmission').
291 In re Mastercard Int'l Inc. Internet Gambling Litig., 313 F.3d 257, 263 (5th Cir. 2002)
(rejecting the argument that amounts owed to the credit card company were accumulated
amounts wagered on online casino sites and thus illegal and uncollectible, by stating
"[b]ecause the Wire Act does not prohibit non-sports internet gambling, any debts incurred
in connection with such gambling are not illegal").
292 See Statement of Kevin V. DiGregory, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal
Division, Before the H. Subcomm. on Crime, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. H.R.,
Concerning Gambling on the Internet (June 24, 1998),
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/kvd0698.htm ("It is the position of the
Department of Justice that a wager, including an electronic or phone wager, occurs in the
location it is placed and in the location in which it is received.").
293 Gottfried, supra note 145, 1 (reporting that, in 2003, fifty-four foreign governments
allowed Internet gambling).
294 See, e.g., Casino City, http://www.casinocityonline.com (last visited Apr. 2, 2006);
Party Poker, http://www.partypoker.com (last visited Apr. 2, 2006); World Sports
Exchange, http://www.wsex.com (last visited Apr. 2, 2006).
295 Lawrence G. Walters, The Law of Online Gambling in the United States A Safe Bet,
or Risky Business?, 7 GAMING L. REv. 445, 445 (2003) (citing over 1,800 sites and 14.5
million users in 2003).
296 Lorraine Woellert, Can Online Betting Change Its Luck?, BUSINESS WEEK, Dec. 20,
2004, at 66.
297 Kim Komando, In Battle Against Online Gambling: Don't Bank on It, CHICAGO SUN-
TIMES, Apr. 25, 2005, at 63 (sixty to sixty-five percent); Woellert, supra note 296, at 67
(seventy percent).
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
gambling as being countries with little or no financial regulation,298 several
large websites are based in the United Kingdom and in Australia, where
Internet gambling is legal, but highly regulated.
In the United Kingdom, for example, online gaming is legal and popular. In
fact, PartyGaming, a U.K. company founded by U.S. expatriates, went public
in June 2005, fully disclosing the fact that ninety percent of its customer base
lived in the United States, a country that stubbornly insists that Internet gaming
by U.S. residents is illegal.299 PartyGaming's registration statement contained
this risk disclosure: "In many countries, including the United States, the
group's activities are considered to be illegal by the relevant authorities.
PartyGaming and its directors rely on the apparent unwillingness or inability of
regulators generally to bring actions against businesses with no physical
presence in the country concerned. '300
1. Public Policy Relating to Prohibiting Internet Gambling
Stated fears concerning Internet gambling are many. However, they are
mere reiterations of concerns expressed about gambling generally. Even the
Department of Justice (DOJ), under the Clinton Administration, warned that
any regulatory response to Internet gambling should treat activity that occurs
on the Internet no differently than the same activity that occurs in the physical
world.30 1 Regulation should focus on the activity to be prohibited, not on the
manner in which that activity is delivered. 30 2 Activity that is legal in the
physical world should not be criminalized merely because it occurs on the
Internet. The following arguments made by online gambling opponents focus
on the social costs of gambling, which are equally applicable to traditional
gambling. In addition, comparisons of Internet gambling to traditional
gambling are not quite apt because the comparison is of an unregulated activity
298 Unlawful Internet Gambling Funding Prohibition Act, H.R. 556, 107th Cong. § 2(4)
(2001) ("Internet gambling conducted through off-shore jurisdictions has been identified by
United States law enforcement officials as a significant money laundering vulnerability.");
see Statement of Kevin V. DiGregory, supra note 292 (naming as countries with remote
gambling sites in 1998 the countries of Antigua, Curacao, Grenada, the Dominican
Republic, Netherland Antilles, Trinidad, St. Vincent, and the Cayman Islands).
299 Kurt Eichenwald, At PartyGaming, Everything's Wild, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2005, §
3, at I (reporting that PartyGaming, although offering its shares in London, is licensed by
Gibraltar).
300 Id.
301 Internet Gambling Funding Prohibition Act: Hearing on H.R. 4419 Before the H.
Comm. on Banking and Financial Services, 106th Cong. 69-70 (2000) (statement of Kevin
V. DiGregory, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice).
302 Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 3125 Before the
Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 36 (2000) [hereinafter
"2000 Hearing on H.R. 3125"] (statement of Kevin V. DiGregory, Deputy Assistant Att'y
Gen., Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice).
[Vol. 86:371
2006] REGULATING PUBLIC MORALS AND PRIVATE MARKETS 417
to a highly regulated activity. 30 3 Any comparison should be of regulated
Internet gambling to traditional gambling.
a. Increases in Problem Gambling
One of the most cited reasons for prohibiting Internet gambling is that it will
create new problem gamblers. This argument will only be persuasive if online
gambling is more likely to cause gambling addiction than conventional
gambling due to characteristics inherent in online gambling.30 4 The following
sections refute the most common arguments against online gambling.
1. Twenty-Four-Hour Access
Any person with access to a computer, an Internet connection, and some
way to send money either through the mail or electronically can gamble on an
Internet site in a matter of minutes. Once gambling, the player can play
nonstop because online casinos never close. This "virtually unfettered access"
has raised concerns that online gaming can unfairly harm gamblers. 30 5
Most physical casinos never close either. Although some states that have
legalized casinos have attempted to pass legislation forcing casinos to close for
one or two hours a day, these measures do not seem to have much staying
power.30 6 As it is, anyone that lives close to a casino or who travels to a casino
can gamble twenty-four hours a day. In fact, casinos are experimenting with
hand-held wireless devices that allow gamblers access to gaming at casino
303 Gottfried, supra note 145, 13.
304 According to a Gallup Lifestyle Poll conducted December 11-14, 2003, thirty percent
of respondents had visited a physical casino in the preceding twelve months, compared to
only one percent of respondents who had visited an online casino. Keamey, supra note 48,
at 283 (reporting also that forty-nine percent had bought a lottery ticket and fifteen percent
had participated in an office pool).
305 See 2000 Hearing on H.R. 3125, supra note 302, at 34 (statement of Kevin V.
DiGregory, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice)
("[B]ecause the Internet provides people with virtually unfettered access to the opportunity
to gamble at any time and from anyplace, Internet gambling presents a greater danger for
compulsive gamblers and can cause severe financial consequences for an unsuccessful
player.").
306 So far, Illinois has maintained a two-hour mandated break in gaming, although
legislative efforts are underway to remove the restriction. Gambling Magazine, Riverboat
Operators Pushing for 24-Hour Gambling Day,
http://gamblingmagazine.com/articles/14/14-490.htm. All surrounding states have twenty-
four hour gaming, including Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, and Wisconsin. American Casino
Guide, U.S. Casino Directory: Indiana Casinos,
http://www.americancasinoguide.com/indiana.shtml; American Casino Guide, U.S. Casino
Directory: Iowa Casinos, http://www.americancasinoguide.com/iowa.shtml; American
Casino Guide, U.S. Casino Directory: Missouri Casinos,
http://www.americancasinoguide.com/missouri.shtml; American Casino Guide, U.S. Casino
Directory: Wisconsin Casinos, http://www.americancasinoguide.com/wisconsin.shtml.
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swimming pools, restaurants, bars, and convention rooms.30 7 Moreover, the
owners of physical casinos are able to subtly manipulate gamblers into
gambling for longer periods of time in ways that an online casino cannot.
Many casinos do not have windows or clocks in an attempt to eliminate any
sense of time passing for the gamblers. Most computers have a clock on their
screen at all times, and gaming websites do not cover up the clock. In
addition, most people have clocks in their houses, and being in the house
ensures that life will catch up with the gambler: the phone will ring, the
doorbell will ring, or other family members will interrupt playing.
2. Gambling at Home
Relatedly, opponents of Internet gambling argue that the presence of
gambling opportunities in the home creates an increased risk of problem
gambling. 30 8 Gamblers no longer have to leave their house or their place of
employment to gamble. 30 9 Secret gamblers will not arouse suspicion by
unexplained absences. 310 These arguments are not persuasive. Admittedly, for
the problem gambler who lives alone, the Internet may speed up the gambler's
addiction by reducing transaction costs such as transportation and incidental
casino costs such as parking, food, and drinks. The farther the problem
gambler lives from a legal casino, the more appealing the Internet sites will be.
However, for problem gamblers with familial obligations, gambling at home
may be harder to hide than in a casino.311 Gamblers who may have aroused
suspicion by sneaking out of the house for hours at a time may also arouse
307 Fox Butterfield, Losing Shirt at Casino Pool (It's Wireless), N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2005,
at Al (reporting that while hotel rooms will not be allowed access for fear of minors
gambling, access will be available at other minor-friendly venues, such as the pool); see
Operation of a Mobile Gaming System, Nev. Gaming Comm'n Regs. 5.220 (Mar. 2006);
Associated Press, Nevada Okays Gambling To Go, Mar. 24, 2006,
http://www.cnn.com/2006/TECH/fun.games/03/24/mobile.gambling.ap/index.html
(reporting the Nevada Gaming Commission's decision to allow "the use of handheld devices
for gambling in any public area of the state's casinos, such as restaurants and poolsides").
308 See Gregory Manter, The Pending Determination of the Legality of Internet Gambling
in the United States, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0016, 6 (2003),
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2003dltr0016.html (referring to supporters of
the Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, which was passed by the U.S. House of
Representatives in 2002).
309 2003 Hearing on H.R. 21 & H.R. 1223, supra note 286, at 2 (statement of Howard
Coble, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security) (referring to
gambling in one's own home and remarking, "By making gambling more convenient, it can
do nothing but make the problem worse").
310 Id. at 10 (statement of John G. Malcolm, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal
Division, U.S. Department of Justice) (testifying that because Internet gambling is a solitary
activity, problem gamblers are able to engage in the activity "uninterrupted" and
"undetected").
311 Gottfried, supra note 145, 29.
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suspicion by sitting at the computer for hours at a time. A spouse can more
easily look over a gambler's shoulder than find out where a gambler spends
unexplained free time. In addition, a worried spouse could track computer use,
pore over credit card receipts, or even block use of the computer or credit
cards.3 12 Spouses could agree to block websites or self-restrict their computer
from websites.
Although websites and software allow computer users to block sites, getting
banned from a casino is more difficult. In some casinos, self-aware reckless
gamblers, but not concerned third parties, can ask that the gambler be excluded
from play or be required to play with cash, not credit.313 Some states require
casinos to offer some variation of an exclusion program. For example, the
Nevada Gaming Commission requires casinos to allow gamblers to exclude
themselves from credit and cash-checking services,3 14 and Missouri requires
riverboat casinos to allow gamblers to request exclusion from the casino.315
However, even voluntary exclusion programs may have little more
effectiveness than merely reminding reckless gamblers to "just say no."
Because casinos do not check for identification at the entrance, a reckless
gambler who has asked to be restricted from the casino will without fail be
allowed to enter the casino. Theoretically, if a dealer or manager recognizes
the gambler, he will be escorted out, but any losses incurred before that time
would not be returned. 316 Ironically, however, the casino may be able to
disallow winnings because winners must show identification to cash in
vouchers and large amounts of chips.317 Generally, casinos are reluctant to
offer full voluntary exclusion, and few regulators have required them to offer
312 See 2003 Hearing on H.R. 21 & H.R. 1223, supra note 286, at 14 (statement of
Jeffrey Modisett, Counsel, Bryan Cave, LLP) ("Because all Internet gaming transactions are
recorded, it is actually easier to track problem gamblers in the cyber world than in the bricks
and mortar casino. Self-exclusion and preset loss limits are more easily accomplished.").
313 Harrah's casino offers "Self-Restriction," which requires the casino to suspend
marketing, extending credit, or check-cashing services to the gambler, as well as "Self-
Exclusion", which terminates play privileges in all Harrah's casinos. Harrah's
Entertainment, Inc., Responsible Gaming, Self-Restriction/Self-Exclusion,
http://www.harrahs.com/about-us/responsible-gaming/index.html#Self (last visited Apr. 2,
2006). At the Bellagio casino, patrons can request restrictions on mailings and credit
services, but not on play privileges. Bellagio Las Vegas, Responsible Gaming,
http://www.bellagio.com/pages/frameset-flash.asp (follow "Responsible Gaming"
hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 2, 2006).
314 Operation of Gaming Establishments, Nev. Gaming Comm'n Regs. 5.170(4) (Nov.
1998), available at http://gaming.nv.gov/stats-regs/reg5.pdf.
315 MO. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 45-17 (2001).
316 See Merrill v. Trump Indiana, Inc., 320 F.3d 729, 732-33 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that
Indiana common law does not allow a casino to be sued in tort for failing to evict a gambler
requesting his own exclusion).
317 See, e.g., Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 45-17.010(3) (2001) ("[A]ll chips, tokens and
electronic credits in the possession of a Disassociated Person at the time s/he is discovered
on an excursion gambling boat are ... subject to forfeiture.").
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it. 318
For the recreational gambler with the potential to become a problem
gambler, Internet gambling may even hold less appeal than casino gambling.
Casino gambling may be entertainment for many tourists, and the sights and
sounds of the casino are not readily duplicated on an Internet site. Internet
gambling does not have the social aspect that some vacation gamblers may
enjoy,319 such as free food and alcohol, glitzy show business acts, or even
amusing people-watching. 320 Most importantly, Internet casinos do not have
managers approaching winner gamblers, persuading them to stay a bit longer
with complimentary services (or "comps").
3. Identification Tracking and Manipulation
Another stated concern is that online gaming software can track individual
preferences and tailor a gambling experience to a player's personality, taking
advantage of a player's weaknesses. 321 Consequently, online players could
lose more money or be enticed to gamble longer. This argument does not hold
up, however, because traditional gambling involves a substantial amount of
manipulation of gamblers' desires as well as identification tracking.
Every aspect of a physical casino is designed to manipulate gamblers.
Carpets with bright colors and complicated patterns attract gamblers' eyes
upward, to gambling machines. 322 Aromas designed to engender good feelings
surround gamblers sitting at machines. 323 The casino atmosphere is filled with
stimulating lights and sounds. A sixteen-inch computer screen can never
compete with the three-dimensional experience of a Las Vegas casino. In
addition, players at many physical casinos are offered free alcoholic drinks to
lower inhibitions and encourage longer playing. 324
As for preference tracking, many large casinos already gather information
on players' preferences. Harrah's, a Las Vegas casino, issues customers
magnetic membership rewards cards. To entice customers to use these cards,
318 But see, e.g., MO. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 45-17 (2001).
319 See Statman, supra note 40, at 17 (contending that a sense of camaraderie helps to
explain the casino visitor's enjoyment of multi-player games such as poker).
320 See Gottfried, supra note 145, 29 (listing techniques that casinos use to create an
environment conducive to gambling, such as "providing free alcohol" and "pumping
pleasing scents into slot machine pits").
321 See Adrian Parke & Mark Griffiths, Why Internet Gambling Prohibition Will
Ultimately Fail, 8 GAMING L. REV. 295, 295 (2004) ("As technology develops there will be
increased scope to manipulate the potentially addictive structural characteristics of gambling
activities to increase the appeal and arousal of the games.").
322 Gottfried, supra note 145, 29.
323 Id.
324 American Gaming Association, Fact Sheets: Casino Alcohol Policies,
http://www.americangaming.org/industry/factsheets/issues-detail.cfv?id 31 (stating that of
the eleven states that allow casino gambling, six states allow the provision of free alcohol).
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Harrah's offers reward credits to card users.325 As players use the cards to
make bets, Harrah's collects information on which games the player plays and
how much the player bets.326 Reward credits can only be awarded in person in
the casino,327 facilitating another trip to the casino. Casinos also share the
collected customer information with other casinos.328
Physical casinos also collect and disseminate information on gamblers for
other reasons. Through ubiquitous surveillance cameras, casinos compile
photographic information on known gamblers who either cheat or "count
cards. '329 Larger casinos are equipped with cameras that film every inch of
gaming space for various reasons, including detecting customer fraud, dealer
fraud, and card counters. As card counters are identified, casinos record their
photographs and any other known information, and willingly share that
information with other casinos. 330 Thus, physical casinos arguably engage in
more identification tracking than do online gaming websites.
4. Losing Intangible Assets Quickly
Some commentators have argued that problem gambling may be
exacerbated on the Internet because players wagering with intangible,
electronic money can lose money rapidly without noticing. 331
Casinos have long realized that putting actual money down for each wager
325 Harrah's Total Rewards: Program Overview,
http://www.harrahs.com/total-rewards/overview/overviewjsp (follow "Benefits" hyperlink)
(last visited Jan. 26, 2006):
As a member of Total Rewards, you will be rewarded for your play .... You will earn
one Base Reward Credit for every $5 coin-in on reel slot machines ($10 video poker).
For table games and other game types, you will earn Base and Bonus Reward Credits
based on your length of play, average bet and the type of game.
See also Kurt Eggert, Truth in Gaming: Toward Consumer Protection in the Gambling
Industry, 63 MD. L. REV. 217, 282-83 (2004) (explaining that these cards track net wins and
losses, then store that information in databases).
326 Harrah's Total Rewards: Program Overview, supra note 325.
327 Id.
328 For example, Griffin Investigations maintains a database of known card counters, and
casinos may subscribe to this database to monitor patrons and compare them to the photos
on file. Griffin Investigations, Products and Services,
http://www.griffininvestigations.com/products.html (last visited April 4, 2006).
329 Counting cards is not illegal, but casinos identify card counters and bar them from
their casinos. This barring may or may not be illegal, but naive card counters often respond
by doing something illegal themselves, like trespassing or disturbing the peace. ROSE &
LOEB, supra note 53, at 33-47.
331 See id. at 100-01 (describing the Griffin detective agency, which facilitates the
compilation and dissemination of information on gamblers among Las Vegas casinos).
331 See Jenna F. Karadbil, Note, Casinos of the Next Millennium: A Look into the
Proposed Ban on Internet Gambling, 17 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 413, 439 (2000) ("The
Internet is detached in the sense that there is no 'tangible representation of money' for the
[gambler] to see how much she has lost or won.").
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inhibits players. The poker chip came into existence in the 1800s and is now
used for all kinds of gaming. 332 Chips allow for bets in an assortment of
denominations and thus ease liquidity as well as weaken behavioral
attachments to cash.33 3 Players can also use bills for slot machines, which
increases the speed of the game and gives players the incentive to play until the
credit is depleted. 334 Some slot machines even pay out winnings with a
voucher, not coins.335  Vouchers can be used for casino play, thereby
encouraging players to keep playing, rather than to stand in line to cash out a
voucher. 336 Even if a player is ready to stop gambling for the day, the gambler
with a small amount on a voucher might just play one or two more times rather
than stand in line to cash out a dollar or two. Internet gambling sites cannot
recreate this highly ingenious effort to reclaim each marginal gambling dollar.
Moreover, extensions of credit are incredibly easy to receive at a casino. 337
On the website for Mirage, a Las Vegas casino, players can pre-apply to be
able to use their "marker" at gaming tables. 338 The Trump Plaza website also
allows players to apply for credit so that they can "rest assured knowing that
you won't need to carry a lot of cash with you. '339 If electronic cash is
dangerously intangible, then being able to gamble without any cash at all is
even more dangerous. Casinos will also give cash advances through ATMs
with just a swipe of a credit card. 340 In addition, casino ATMs will also offer
users credit card cash advances when the player's ATM card has reached its
daily withdrawal limit. 34 1 Legislative efforts to separate credit cards and ATM
332 Pete Rizzo, A Short History of Poker Chips in the U.S.,
http://www.pokerpages.com/pokerinfo/pokerchips/pokerchip-history.htm (last visited April
4, 2006).
... See JENSEN, supra note 258, at 40 (remarking that most players drop unused tokens in
machines as they exit the casino instead of cashing in the chips for cash).
114 See id. at 17 (commenting that most slots will accept bills up to $100).
115 See id. at 40-41 (describing vouchers as thin pieces of paper, easy to lose or destroy,
that expire in thirty days).
336 Bill Burton, Coinless Slot Machines,
http://casinogambling.about.com/cs/slots/a/coinlessslots.htm (last visited April 4, 2006)
(explaining the "psychological ploy" that vouchers encourage players to play until the
voucher has been depleted).
117 See Gottfried, supra note 145, 97 (reporting that forty to sixty percent of cash
wagered in a casino was not brought onto the premises but acquired after arrival through
ATM or credit transactions).
... Mirage, Las Vegas Casino, http://www.mirage.com/casino (last visited Apr. 2, 2006)
(follow "Market Application" hyperlink).
33' Trump Plaza, Credit, http://www.trumpplaza.com (last visited Feb. 3, 2006) (follow
"Casino" hyperlink; then follow "Credit" hyperlink).
340 Ellen Drought, Note, Navigating Scylla and Charybdis: In re Briese, Gambling and
Credit Card Debt Dischargeability, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 1323, 1347 (1997) (describing a
Wisconsin casino offering "Cash & Win" checks purchasable by credit card).
341 The author observed this practice firsthand during a trip to Mandalay Bay in Las
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cards from casino gambling have failed.342 Some slot machine companies
have even proposed designing slot machines that accept credit or debit cards
issued by banks.343 In addition, casinos are developing smart debit cards. 344
Thus, physical casinos may be ahead of Internet casinos in the race to make
cash money disappear easily.
5. Underage Gambling
In all U.S. jurisdictions that allow some form of gambling, players must
have reached an age of majority. Generally, patrons of casinos must be
twenty-one or older to gamble.345 Most state lotteries allow teenagers eighteen
or older to buy lottery tickets, and some states allow younger individuals to
redeem them if the buyer transfers the ticket to a minor.346 One common
argument against Internet gambling is that underage players will be able to
participate more easily by fooling a website into allowing the minor to play.34 7
In fact, this argument seems to resonate with lawmakers the most. 348 However,
this argument is not as cogent as it would appear.
First, in countries where Internet gambling is permitted, regulations have
been implemented to ensure that players are of legal age. For example, a
player may be required to send in physical identification documents, or use
some other verification system, before being allowed to play.34 9
Second, physical casinos are not effectively off-limits to minors. Opponents
of Internet gambling point out that traditional casinos have the ability to
Vegas on June 4, 2005.
342 Gambling ATM and Credit/Debit Card Reform Act, H.R. 2572, 107th Cong. (2001)
(attempting to prohibit the placement of credit extension devices in the immediate area of a
gambling establishment).
343 Bill Burton, InCREDITibly Stupid Slot Idea,
http: //casinogambling.about.com/library/weekly/aa 100801 .htm (discussing Innovative
Gaming Corp.'s plan to make a "credit driven machine").
344 See JENSEN, supra note 258, at 42.
345 For example, at the Potawatomi Casino in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, patrons eighteen
and over may play bingo; all other games are reserved for patrons twenty-one and over. The
author gathered this info by calling the casino's toll-free telephone number, 1-800-PAYS-
BIG.
346 See, e.g., Wisconsin Lottery, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.wilottery.com/faqreplies.asp?faqid= 0 (last visited Apr. 2, 2006).
141 See 2000 Hearing on H.R. 3125, supra note 302, at 34 (statement of Kevin V.
DiGregory, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice)
("Currently, Internet gambling businesses have no reliable way of confirming that gamblers
are not minors who have gained access to a credit card and are gambling on their
websites.").
341 See Internet Gambling Licensing and Regulating Commission Act, H.R. 1223, 108th
Cong. (2003).
141 See Gottfried, supra note 145, 38.
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exclude minor players. 5 ° Of course, anyone can enter through the front door
of a casino. Any teenager who appears to be older may be able to play
indefinitely in a casino before anyone asks the player's age. 351 To redeem
vouchers or chips, some casinos require proof of age but may not ask for
identification if the player does not look youthful . In addition, a minor
gambler can have a friend cash in his winnings for him. Interestingly, casinos
seem less worried about children entering the casino and losing money than
children entering the casino and winning money.
Arguably, gambling in a casino may be easier for some minors than
gambling online. In a physical casino, a minor can bring in cash, obtained
from whatever source. However, in an Internet casino, the minor will have to
use a different financial product than cash. He will need a credit card or a
debit card to use a website directly, or will have to purchase electronic cash or
have a bank account from which money can be routed. Further, any winnings
will be either credited to the card or the account or sent to the card or account
holder's address. 353 Therefore, if a minor attempts to use a parent's credit card
or bank account information, all winnings will be sent to the parent.354 The
average teenager may not have a credit card or bank account that a parent does
not control or monitor.
For children under the age of eighteen who live at home, the Internet offers
parents new tools for monitoring minors' gambling activities. Parents can
install blockers that restrict minors' use of certain websites or use monitoring
software that alerts parents of their children's gambling activities. 355 Parents
may find discovering evidence of online gambling easier than monitoring
350 See 2003 Hearing on H.R. 21 & H.R. 1223, supra note 286, at 10 (statement of John
G. Malcolm, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice)
("Unlike traditional physical casinos ... the operators of gambling websites cannot look at
their customers to assess their age and request photo identification.").
351 See Habib, supra note 229, at 66 (pointing out that one underage college poker player
was banned from Foxwoods casino only when he tried to purchase an alcoholic beverage
and that one female player routinely gambled there with a fake ID).
352 For example, Harrah's website states that "[a]ll Harrah's employees are trained to
card individuals who appear to be below the age of 30." Harrah's Entertainment, Inc.,
Responsible Gaming, Project 21,
http://www.harrahs.com/about-us/responsible-gaming/index.html#Project (last visited Apr.
2, 2006).
353 See Gottfried, supra note 145, 34.
354 Id.
351 One such blocking software product, GamBlock, is targeted specifically to problem
gamblers. GamBlock, http://www.gamblock.com (last visited Apr. 2, 2006). Once the
software is installed, all gaming sites are blocked and the software cannot be un-installed.
GamBlock, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.gamblock.com ) (last visited Apr. 2,
2006) (follow "FAQ's" hyperlink). Other types of software are not targeted to gambling but
merely allow parents to block certain sites and track activity. America Online provides this
kind of service, called AOL® Guardian. America Online, Parental Controls,
http://discover.aol.com/aolfeatures.adp?dl =2&d2=4 (last visited Apr. 2, 2006).
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activities outside the home, especially with driving-age teenagers.
Lastly, some opponents have even argued that allowing adults to gamble at
home, where children can view the gambling, is dangerous and could lead to
the children becoming problem gamblers. 356 This argument, standing alone, is
particularly unpersuasive given the panoply of behaviors that the United States
does allow in an individual's home. 357 A parent can subscribe to pornographic
materials either in print or on the Internet, drink alcoholic beverages, and use
tobacco products at home where minors are present, even though these
activities are officially restricted to adults.
Admittedly, the ability to gamble over the Internet increases for minors over
eighteen who live outside their parents' homes. Particularly for college
students living away from home, with unlimited time and a credit card "for
emergencies," all forms of gambling are quite tempting. 358 Unfortunately,
parents who pay off gambling debts may just be assisting their freshman
gambler in continuing the activity. Although online gambling is a temptation
for these underage individuals, it is but one of many temptations, and even
only one of many gambling temptations. 359 In addition, some gambling
activities, such as bingo and the lottery, are legal for this age group.
To the extent that arguments about the welfare of minors are persuasive,
they are more so when speaking of the eighteen- to twenty-year-olds who live
independently from their parents and choose to gamble. This slice of the
gambling population, however, which is allowed access to state-sponsored
lotteries, may be insufficiently large to support an industry-wide prohibition.
b. Increased Problem Gambling Increases Social Costs
As gambling is introduced into a jurisdiction, the community may begin to
suffer as social ills increase. By comparing U.S. counties where legalized
casinos were introduced for the first time with counties without casinos during
the same time period, studies have shown that counties in which casinos are
introduced, and the counties that surround them, experience an increase in the
356 See Gottfried, supra note 145, 36.
157 Interestingly, one of the anti-Internet gambling bills introduced in the 106th Congress,
the Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1999, H.R. 3125, 106th Cong. (1999), would have
expanded existing law to allow U.S. residents to make wagers from their homes on horse
races, dog races, and jai alai using a "closed-loop subscriber-based service." 2000 Hearing
on H.R. 3125, supra note 302, at 35 (statement of Kevin V. DiGregory, Deputy Assistant
Att'y Gen., Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice) (expressing concern to the
Judiciary Committee that the bill was not supportable because it prohibited online gaming
while allowing pari-mutuel betting over the Internet that is not currently allowable over the
telephone).
358 See Habib, supra note 229, at 66 (profiling an Indiana University junior with an
addiction to poker, both online and live, who gambled with cash advances from his friends'
credit cards).
159 See id. (describing a regular live poker match at Yale's Trumbull residential college).
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crime rate.360 One study estimated that the total cost of introducing a casino in
a county was seventy-five dollars per adult given the increase in crime
alone. 361 Other studies show an increase in bankruptcy rates coincident with
the introduction of tribal casinos.3 62 However, studies have failed to show an
exact causal link between problem gambling and these crimes because of a
lack of data on the reasons why crimes are committed. 363 Even if we assume
that the introduction of casino gambling increases problem gambling, which in
turn leads to increases in bankruptcies, crime, and possibly divorce,3 64
opponents of Internet gambling would have to prove that gambling over the
Internet would exacerbate the incidence of these negative externalities. 365 The
argument would have to prove that legalization of Internet gambling would
increase the level of gambling generally and not that Internet gambling would
displace existing casino customers. 366  In addition, the level of problem
gambling would have to increase as a result of the legalization of Internet
gambling at a rate higher than problem gambling increases from the addition of
traditional gambling opportunities.
c. Money Laundering
The rationale that Internet gambling websites create opportunities for money
laundering and may be linked to organized crime is cited in both the "findings"
section of all three unsuccessful anti-Internet gambling bills in the 108th
Congress 367 and in the U.S. government's written arguments to the World
360 Kearney, supra note 48, at 286-87 (citing a 2004 study that compared all 3,165 U.S.
counties for FBI Index 1 offenses: robbery, aggravated assault, rape, murder, larceny,
burglary, and auto theft).
361 Id. at 287 ("[R]oughly eight percent of crime in casino counties in 1996 was
attributable to casinos, costing the average adult $75 per year.").
362 Id. at 286 (describing a different study as finding that in counties where tribal casinos
were introduced, bankruptcy rates and violent crime increased ten percent); see Person
Liddell et al., Internet Gambling: On a Roll?, 28 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 315, 337 (2004)
(citing a 1997 study that found that gambling was the third leading cause of bankruptcies).
363 See Kearney, supra note 48, at 278 (discussing how pathological gamblers often have
other behavioral disorders, thus making it difficult to establish a causal link).
364 ROSE & OWENS, supra note 33, at 139 (citing as the greatest threat to legal gambling
increased incidents of "suicide, divorce, loss ofjobs, and imprisonment").
365 See Binyamin Appelbaum, Old Games, ANew Twist, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, May, 16,
2005, at DI (quoting Keith Whyte, executive director of National Council of Problem
Gambling, as saying that because of the information potential of the Internet, "online
gambling has the potential to be safer than casino gambling").
366 See Kearney, supra note 48, at 288 (positing that Internet gambling might
"cannibalize" state lottery sales and casino revenue).
361 See, e.g., S. 627, 108th Cong. § 2(4) (2003) ("Congress finds that... (4) Internet
gambling conducted through offshore jurisdictions has been identified by United States law
enforcement officials as a significant money laundering vulnerability ... ").
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Trade Organization (WTO) defending its anti-Internet gambling stance. 368 As
argued below, these concerns exist with any type of electronic commerce.
Arguably, Internet gambling provides an easy forum for money laundering
by allowing criminals to place ill-gotten gains into remote accounts, gamble a
negligible amount, and then have their account balances mailed to them as
legal "winnings. '369 Because traditional casinos, like banks, handle large
amounts of cash and offer an array of credit services to gamblers, arguments
connecting money laundering to gambling pre-date Internet gambling and have
proved to hold true for physical casino gambling.370 To curb this potential for
abuse, the federal government included casinos as "financial institutions" that
must follow regulations under the Bank Secrecy Act 371 and report the name
and social security number of all patrons who, within a twenty-four-hour
period, spend a total of $10,000 or more in cash or receive $2,500 or more in
cash as an extension of credit.372
Because remote gaming websites also handle monetary transactions and,
moreover, are out of the reach of U.S. banking regulators3 73 the same money
laundering that occurs in physical casinos may also take place in the accounts
of an online casino. Ironically, by pressuring the U.S. credit card industry to
abandon the Internet gambling market to foreign banks and electronic cash
services companies, the U.S. government has made it easier for money to be
laundered through the many necessary layers involved in getting U.S. cash to
368 Panel Report, United States Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004), available at 2004 WL
2650633, at *77 [hereinafter "Panel Report"] ("The United States has provided evidence
showing that US law enforcement authorities have seen organized crime playing a growing
role in Internet gambling.").
369 NGISC REPORT, supra note 15, at 5-6.
370 See 2003 Hearing on H.R. 21 & H.R. 1223, supra note 286, at 11 (statement of John
G. Malcolm, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice)
(stating that criminals have turned from laundering money through banks to casinos, which
offer "credit accounts, fund transmittal services, check cashing services, and currency
exchange services"). But see ROSE & LOEB, supra note 53, at 105-06 (arguing that the
"war" on drugs was a pretextual excuse for including casinos in the Bank Secrecy Act and
that the true rationale behind the gaming focus was a desire to track gamblers for income tax
purposes).
371 Bank Records and Foreign Transactions Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114
(1984); Casino Regulations, 50 Fed. Reg. 5065, 5065 (Feb. 6, 1985) (amending 31 C.F.R.
pt. 103 "to include gambling casinos in the definition of financial institution").
372 ROSE & LOEB, supra note 53, at 102-03.
171 See 2003 Hearing on H.R. 21 & H.R. 1223, supra note 286, at 11 (statement of John
G. Malcolm, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice):
On-line casinos are a particularly inviting target because, in addition to using the
gambling that on-line casinos offer as a way to hide or transfer money, on-line casinos
offer a broad array of financial services to their customers, such as providing credit
accounts, fund transmittal services, check cashing services, and currency exchange
services.
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an offshore gaming website. 374 Anti-Internet gambling opponents seem to base
their arguments on the fact that many remote gambling websites are hosted by
smaller countries with regulatory schemes that are unknown to the U.S.
government, such as Antigua and Gibraltar. 375 As the government of Antigua
pointed out to the WTO, the U.S. government does not cite to any investigation
or case involving Internet gambling and money laundering. 376 In fact, the
Financial Action Task Force and the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force
have found no evidence of money laundering in Antigua. 377 In addition, many
popular gaming websites are hosted by the United Kingdom and Australia,
countries that have instituted rigorous regulatory schemes for online
gambling. 378  The money laundering concerns expressed by the U.S.
government are concerns about electronic commerce over the Internet and
would be equally applicable to any commercial website located outside the
United States.
d. Fraud
A related concern is that these gaming websites may be unfairly presenting
games to players with much lower odds than advertised or expected.379 Most
games on remote websites do not operate entirely by chance, but by algorithms
meant to simulate chance in an electronic format °80 For example, slot
machines on a gaming website virtually spin and then stop in a computer-
generated manner, not by physically spinning rotary wheels that stop via the
laws of physics. Opponents argue that these algorithms are unknowable to
players and regulators and could be designed to produce no winners or fewer
winners than would be expected or that is advertised.38 1 However, most slot
174 Susan Ormond, Pending U.S. Legislation to Prohibit Offshore Internet Gambling
May Proliferate Money Laundering, 10 L. & Bus. REv. AM. 447,451-54 (2004).
175 See Panel Report, supra note 368, at * 16 ("The United States submits that Antigua's
attempts to regulate gambling and money laundering cannot address basic concerns relating
to remote supply of gambling.").
376 Id. at *72.
377 Id. (pointing out that in 1999 the United States itself lifted a "Financial Advisory" in
relation to money laundering that it had previously imposed on Antigua and Barbuda).
378 RoSE & OWENS, supra note 33, at 197, 197-200 (describing the "first comprehensive
system for licensing and regulating Internet gambling" developed by New Zealand and then
adopted by other British commonwealth countries, including England and Australia).
179 See Panel Report, supra note 368, at *14, *73 (outlining the various types of frauds
that can be perpetrated by "criminal firms" and quoting the United States as alleging that the
"potential for fraud is heightened when gambling opportunities are supplied from remote
locations").
380 Id. at *63.
381 See id. at *78 (criticizing Antigua for ignoring "the inherent manipulability of Internet
gambling," pointing to the NGISC's claim that "the global dispersion of Internet gambling
operations makes the vigilant regulation of the algorithms of Internet games nearly
impossible").
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machines in casinos are not manually operated slot machines either. 38 2
Electronic gaming devices featuring video poker have the same game integrity
problems as an online poker game. Opponents argue that even though EGDs
and electronic slot machines in the United States are equally as susceptible to
corrupt programming, these machines are subject to U.S. regulation and
oversight. 38 3 However, most casino operators and EGD websites are loosely
supervised and subject only to self-reporting of errors. 384
Other technologies may allow colluding gamblers to cheat on group poker
websites. If three friends join in a hand of Texas Hold'em against one stranger
on the Internet, the three friends, either physically together in a computer lab,
in a laptop huddle, or in communication via Instant Messenger or cell phone,
can collude.385 This is a particular vulnerability of one online game, and one
that many players are able to detect and avoid by exiting the game. In
addition, websites claim to monitor for this type of fraud.3 86
These arguments for prohibition of online gambling ignore the fact that a
market exists for Internet gambling and that websites seek to attract gamblers
by presenting themselves as sound institutions. For example,
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) audits online websites and provides a PWC
stamp of approval. 387 If Internet gaming were regulated, U.S. firms could
dominate the market with websites with internal controls as strict as those in
physical casinos, if not stricter. Through branding and market influence,
rational consumers would then have safe Internet gambling options.38 In the
382 JENSEN, supra note 258, at 15-17 (explaining that although some slots have spinning
reels, they are controlled by a computer; others are electronic games that simulate spinning
reels on a video screen).
383 See id. at 125 (describing how slot machines are controlled by a computer chip that is
set by a factory mechanic while being supervised by a gaming commission agent).
384 See NGISC REPORT, supra note 15, at 3-6 ("State regulators often rely upon the
casinos to maintain logs that document irregularities and to 'self-report' violations.").
385 See Steven E. Hurdle, Jr., Note, Cyberbust: The Elimination of Gambling on the
Jnternet, 2004 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 4 (2004) (describing the mechanics of "electronic
cheating").
386 See, e.g., Party Poker, Game Fairness,
http://www.partypoker.com/about-us/game-fairness (last visited Apr. 2, 2006) ("Our
collusion prevention system detects fraud patterns and identifies colluders.").
387 Appelbaum, supra note 365, at DI (indicating that several consumer websites and
chat rooms contain quality information on gambling sites and that PWC offers a
certification program to "[s]everal dozen" casinos).
388 See Liddell, supra note 362, at 349-50 (explaining that "[b]rand recognition leads to
source credibility"). The MGM Mirage entered the offshore casino market but folded out of
fear of losing its Nevada license. Woellert, supra note 296, at 67. At one time, the major
U.S. casinos each had plans for online gambling sites that would hopefully have a spillover
effect for their physical sites. Liz Benston, WPT Launches New Internet Poker Room, LAS
VEGAS SuN, June 29, 2005, at C3 (giving as examples casinos such as MGM Mirage,
Harrah's Entertainment Inc., and Las Vegas Sands Corp.); see 60 Minutes (CBS television
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United Kingdom and Australia, for example, online companies go through
rigorous licensing procedures. 38 9
Allegations of fraud have not escaped traditional gambling, either.
Professional blackjack players concede that human dealers can cheat players
easily with sleight of hand dealing of the second card in the deck, using uneven
decks, heavy with low cards, or preferential shuffling.390
Online sites that accept credit card or some type of electronic transfer may
also be able to defraud gamblers by making unauthorized transfers. 391 Hacking
from outsiders may also be a risk; however, there is no evidence that online
gaming sites have less interest in keeping out hackers than any other online
business. Proponents of online gambling point out that fears of fraud and
privacy breaches are concerns inherent in electronic payment systems,
particularly foreign electronic payment systems, and are not specific to Internet
gaming. 392 The best way to protect gambling consumers would be to regulate
Internet gaming, allow U.S. websites and payment systems to re-enter the
market, and extend the requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act to online gaming
sites. 393
Other commentators have noted that in comparing online gambling with
physical gambling sites in the United States, the opponents of online gambling
are comparing an industry that is highly regulated by the United States to an
illegal industry that is unregulated. 394 The conclusion from that comparison
need not be to continue to prohibit online gambling and create more barriers to
broadcast Nov. 20, 2005) (quoting the CEO of MGM Mirage as saying that allowing
Internet gambling would double the revenue of that company). However, these casinos
abandoned their plans after anti-gambling bills in the 108th Congress seemed to gain
momentum. See Caroline Bissett, All Bets Are Off(Line): Antigua's Trouble in Virtual
Paradise, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 367, 377-78 (2004) (describing how MGM
Mirage Online "closed its site one week before the House vote with a $5 million dollar loss
due to the elimination of U.S. gamblers from its market").
389 ROSE & OWENS, supra note 33, at 197-200.
390 See ROSE & LOEB, supra note 53, at 65-67 ("Complaints about altering the deck with
extra small cards or removing high cards persist within the blackjack publications and
Internet sites. Although objective confirmation of such reports are rare, their numbers
suggest that the practice endures."); see also Zaika v. Del Webb Corp., 508 F. Supp. 1005,
1005 (D. Nev. 1981) (alleging that plaintiffs blackjack losses were the result of an extra
card put in the deck by the casino).
391 2000 Hearing on H.R. 3125, supra note 302, at 34 (statement of Kevin V. DiGregory,
Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice) ("Fraudulent
activities can range from credit card fraud to the manipulation of gambling odds.").
392 See Liddell, supra note 362, at 349-51 (analogizing a hypothetical world with legal,
regulated online casinos to the current reality of securely shopping at Sears.com).
393 Gottfried, supra note 145, 25 (advocating the extension of the Bank Secrecy Act to
Internet gambling sites to "help create the audit trails useful to law enforcement agents in
tracking money launderers").
394 See id. 13; see supra note 289 and accompanying text.
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participation. Instead, the U.S. government could create a regulatory regime
for online gambling that would enhance protections against money laundering
and fraud.
VI. GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSE TO INTERNET GAMBLING
A. U.S. Enforcement ofAnti-Gambling Laws Against Internet Gambling
Sites
Although the U.S. government asserts that the Wire Communications Act
applies to all online betting, not just sports betting, most prosecutions of
remote gaming sites have involved sports betting. The most publicized
prosecution for violating the Wire Communications Act by maintaining an
offshore betting website focused on Jay Cohen, whose conviction was upheld
by the Second Circuit in United States v. Cohen.395 Cohen, a former securities
trader, had started a bookmaking enterprise, World Sports Exchange (WSE), in
Antigua with other Americans. 396 Customers in the United States would wire
money to a WSE account in Antigua and then place sports bets either by
telephone or by Internet. 397 Cohen appealed his conviction and twenty-one-
month sentence on several grounds, including that the rule of lenity required
his conviction to be reversed. 398  Under this due process concept, his
conviction could be reversed if a statute was being applied in a novel way that
no defendant could have predicted given the statutory text and existing case
law.399 The Second Circuit rejected that argument. 400 At the same time that
Cohen was indicted, twenty-one other defendants involved in offshore
bookmaking were charged with violations of the Wire Act.40 1
Other reported prosecutions of Internet gambling have been sparse. Prior to
Cohen, the State of New York had successfully prosecuted World Interactive
Gaming Corporation in its jurisdiction under both state law and the Wire Act.
395 260 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2001).
396 Id. at 70.
397 Id.
391 Id. at 76 (detailing Cohen's argument that the Wire Act is "too unclear to provide fair
warning of what conduct it prohibits").
399 Id.
400 Id. at 76-77.
401 See Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Jay Cohen Convicted of Operating an Off-
Shore Sports Betting Business that Accepted Bets from Americans over the Internet (Feb.
28, 2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/cohen.htm (detailing that
"[t]en of those defendants subsequently plead guilty.., three plead guilty to related
misdemeanor counts; and seven ... remain as fugitives"). Notably, WSE remains in
business and is one of the largest online sports casinos. See Sheckel Masoud, The Of fshore
Quandary: The Impact of Domestic Regulation on Licensed Offshore Gambling Companies,
25 WHITTIER L. REV. 989, 997 (2004) (remarking that the court's decision had a "negligible
impact" on WSE).
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In that case, People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp.,402 the state court had
unhesitatingly applied the Wire Communications Act to non-sports casino
gambling, even though the DOJ stated at the time that some ambiguity existed
as to that applicability. 40 3 Most recently, the federal government in 2001 and
2002 indicted several Americans, their accountants, and their attorneys for
conspiracy to violate the Wire Communications Act and conspiracy to commit
money laundering in connection with Gold Medal Sports, an offshore
bookmaking website located on the island of Curacao.40 4 The two main
owners pled guilty to violating the Wire Communications Act and falsifying
income tax returns and were sentenced to five years in prison.40 5
B. Recent Legislative Attempts to Prohibit Internet Gambling
In 1996, Congress assembled the National Gambling Impact Study
Commission to "conduct a comprehensive legal and factual study of the social
and economic impacts of gambling in the United States, '40 6 including "the use
of interactive technologies and the Internet. ' '40 7 The NGISC issued its final
report on June 18, 1999, in which the commission recommended that the
federal government take further steps to prohibit Internet gambling.40 8
Following the issuance of that report, numerous bills have been introduced in
Congress that would specifically criminalize some aspect of Internet gambling,
from hosting and participating to providing financial payment mechanisms and
advertising. 40 9 Although the DOJ takes the official position that Internet
402 714 N.Y.S.2d 844, 865 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (holding that a Delaware corporation
that owned an Antiguan subsidiary that operated an online casino had violated both New
York state law and federal law).
403 Id. at 862.
404 Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Florida Lawyer Charged in Offshore Sports
Betting Case (Oct. 22, 2002), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/tedderlndict.htm ("The indictment caps a three-
year undercover and financial investigation conducted by federal authorities into illegal
offshore sports bookmaking.").
405 Id.
406 National Gambling Impact Study Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 104-169, § 4(a)(1),
110 Stat. 1482, 1484 (1996).
401 Id. § 4(a)(2)(F).
408 NGISC REPORT, supra note 15, at 5-12 (recommending the development of
"enforcement strategies that include, but are not limited to, Internet service providers, credit
card providers, money transfer agencies, makers of wireless communications systems, and
others who intentionally or unintentionally facilitate Internet gambling transactions").
409 In the 106th Congress, a flurry of bills were introduced to implement the
recommendations of the NGISC. See, e.g., Unlawful Internet Gambling Funding
Prohibition Act, H.R. 4419, 106th Cong. (2000) (introduced by Rep. Leach); Internet
Gambling Prohibition Act of 1999, S. 692, 106th Cong. (1999) (introduced by Sen. Kyl).
Although none of these bills were signed into law, similar bills were introduced in the 107th
Congress. See, e.g., Internet Gambling Payments Prohibition Act, H.R. 2579, 107th Cong.
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gambling is illegal under existing law, 410 these bills have sought to clarify any
ambiguity in the Wire Act and to focus on collateral activity that facilitates the
online gaming industry.
In the 108th Congress, one bill was introduced in the Senate under the title
"Internet Gambling Funding Prohibition Act" 411 and two bills were introduced
in the House of Representatives, both with the title "Unlawful Internet
Gambling Prohibition Act. '412 All three substantially identical bills4 13 sought
to prohibit the use of credit cards issued by U.S. financial institutions by users
of Internet gambling. One such bill, H.R. 2143, detailed new electronic
funding procedures, to be monitored by a new Office of Electronic Funding
Oversight, which would require financial institutions to develop and
implement policies and procedures "reasonably designed to identify...
and.., block.., or... prevent" the extension of credit for purposes of
Internet gambling.414 Interestingly, the bill exempted from prohibition the use
of electronic credit over the Internet to make otherwise legal interstate or
intrastate bets or wagers on live horse and live dog racing. 415 None of these
bills was passed by both houses before the end of the 108th Congress.
Notably, one competing bill was introduced in the 108th Congress that
proposed creating an Internet Gambling Licensing and Regulation Study
Commission to consider regulating Internet gambling.416 The findings of H.R.
1223 contained the reasoning that "[b]ecause of the nature of the Internet,
legislative attempts to prohibit Internet gambling are unlikely to be effective,
and may adversely impact American's [sic] rights to due process and
individual privacy. '417 The Department of Justice opposed this bill, taking the
(2001) (introduced by Rep. LaFalce); Unlawful Internet Gambling Funding Prohibition Act,
H.R. 556, 107th Cong. (2001) (introduced by Rep. Leach).
410 Letter from Jon P. Jennings, supra note 290 (urging the Judiciary Committee not to
introduce new anti-gambling legislation, but instead to amend the Wire Act to clarify that it
prohibits all bets and wagers, not just sports-related bets and wagers, over the Internet,
telephone, or other wireless communications facility).
411 S. 627, 108th Cong. (2003) (introduced by Sen. Kyl).
412 H.R. 21, 108th Cong. (2003) (introduced by Rep. Leach); H.R. 2143, 108th Cong.
(2003) (introduced by Rep. Bachus).
413 The findings for H.R. 21 and H.R. 2143 cited as reasons for regulation "debt
collection problems for insured depository institutions and the consumer credit industry"
and "significant money laundering vulnerability." H.R. 21 § 2(3) & (4); H.R. 2143 § 2(3) &
(4). But see S. 627 § 2 (adding § 5, which warned of the "possibility of immediate,
individual, 24-hour access in every home to the full range of wagering opportunities on
sporting events or casino-like contests").
414 H.R. 2143 § 3(b)(1).
415 Id. § 4(1) (limiting the bill's reach to "restricted transactions," defined as transactions
in connection with "unlawful Internet gambling," not Internet gambling currently allowed).
416 Internet Gambling Licensing and Regulation Commission Act, H.R. 1223, 108th
Cong. (2003) (introduced by Rep. Conyers).
417 See id. § 2(9).
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position that regulation, not prohibition, was not feasible, and that the only way
to protect American consumers was to prohibit Internet gambling.4 18
A brief pause in legislative action coincided with efforts by the country of
Antigua and Barbuda to demonstrate to the World Trade Organization that the
cumulative effect of U.S. laws was to prohibit Internet gambling sites located
in that country from doing business in the United States in violation of U.S.
commitments under the General Agreement on Trade in Service (GATS).4 19
Perhaps legislators were awaiting the outcome of the ruling, described
below, 42 which became final in April 2005.421 On February 16, 2006, a new
bill was introduced in the House of Representatives with the title "Internet
Gambling Prohibition Act."422 Interestingly, the bill has 115 co-sponsors.
423
C. Leveraging Financial Institutions and the Media to Prohibit Internet
Gambling
Although federal lawmakers have been unable to pass new legislation
clarifying that federal laws prohibit Internet gambling, prosecutors have turned
their attention from gambling establishments and gamblers to the legitimate
businesses that facilitate Internet gambling: financial institutions and members
of the advertising industry. For a gambler to be able to make a wager over the
Internet on an offshore site, he must first find the site and then find a way to
get money from the United States to that website's host. Recently, prosecutors
have decided to frustrate gambler's access to online gambling by focusing on
these two necessary conditions to Internet play.
Federal and state prosecutors, 424 including New York Attorney General
Eliot Spitzer,425 threatened financial institutions with various crimes for
418 2003 Hearing on H.R. 21 & H.R. 1223, supra note 286, at II (statement of John G.
Malcolm, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice)
("[T]he Department believes that Internet gambling should be prohibited .... ").
419 See Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Antigua and Barbuda, United States
Measures Affection the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services,
WT/DS285/2 (June 13, 2003), available at 2003 WL 2138159 [hereinafter "Antigua Panel
Request"].
420 See infra Part VI.D.
421 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R (April 7, 2005), available at
2005 WL 852159 [hereinafter "Appellate Report"].
422 H.R. 4777, 109th Cong. (2006).
423 id.
424 For example, the State of Oregon has passed a law making the acceptance of credit
cards, electronic funds transfers, or checks by an online gambling business a Class C felony.
OR. REV. STAY. § 167.109 (2003).
425 See Manter, supra note 308, 8 (describing how Spitzer threatened Citibank with
prosecution for "knowingly profiting from an illegal activity" before Citibank agreed not to
allow gambling charges and to donate $400,000 to compulsive gambler counseling
services).
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facilitating Internet gambling, including violating the Patriot Act, which
prohibits transferring money known to be connected to criminal activity,
prompting financial institutions to change their own policies. After paying ten
million dollars in forfeiture payments to the DOJ426 and two hundred thousand
dollars to settle a parallel investigation brought by Spitzer, PayPal, which was
bought by eBay, agreed to abandon the lucrative Internet gaming business. 427
PayPal, which offers electronic payment services tied to a credit card or bank
account, continues to dominate the online auction industry, but other non-U.S.
companies have stepped in to fill the gambling void, most notably Neteller. 428
PartyGaming, the U.K. gambling website that went public in 2005, has its own
in-house electronic payment system. 429
Following the PayPal settlement, some banks that issue MasterCard and
Visa cards also agreed to disallow payments to offshore gambling sites. 430 In
addition, Discover and American Express have agreed to disallow these
charges as well.431 However, most online gaming sites prominently display
MasterCard and Visa signs to reflect the continuing availability of those forms
of payment. 432 As long as the card is not issued by one of the few, mostly
large, merchant banks that will decline the payment, the card will be
accepted. 433 In fact, many sites continued to claim to also accept PayPal, even
after PayPal withdrew from the market.434
The Department of Justice also turned its attention to advertisers and
advertising agencies in 2004, sending a letter to members of the National
Association of Broadcasters threatening media outlets that accepted advertising
from offshore gambling websites with prosecution for aiding and abetting
426 In re PayPal, Inc. (E.D. Mo. July 24, 2003) (on file with author).
427 Woellert, supra note 296, at 67.
428 See Maija Pesola, ANeteller is Seeking a Banking Venture, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2005, at
24 (reporting that Neteller opens 2,700 new customer accounts per day).
429 Spencer E. Ante, Looks Like a Sure Thing, butt.... Bus. WK., July 4, 2005, at 41; see
supra notes 299-300 and accompanying text.
430 See Komando, supra note 297, at 63 (pointing out that Chicago-based BankOne
declines such credit card transactions); see also Parke & Griffiths, supra note 321, at 296-97
(describing the two-tier system in which individual merchant banks that issue these cards
are ultimately responsible for monitoring and enforcing stated policies that these cards may
only be used for legal transactions).
41 Peer-to-Peer Gaming Coming Soon to America, TECHWEBNEWS, July 7, 2004,
http://intemetweek.cmp.com/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=22104153.
412 Parke & Griffiths, supra note 321, at 297-98 (commenting that the USGAO reports
that eighty-five percent of online gaming sites conspicuously claim to accept Visa and
MasterCard credit cards, but that some of those claims rely on the fact that a U.S. resident
can use the cards to open accounts at electronic payment systems such as NETeller).
433 Id.
434 Id. at 298 (citing the USGAO report that two-thirds of online gaming sites continue to
advertise PayPal as an accepted payment aggregator).
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violations of the Wire Act.435 Newspapers and magazines that had routinely
sold advertising to online casinos for years were issued subpoenas and
threatened with prosecution unless they stopped immediately.436 Ironically,
Discovery Communications, whose Travel Channel was airing the World
Poker Tour from the Bellagio casino in Las Vegas, was threatened with felony
prosecution and had $3.2 million seized by federal marshals not for nationally
broadcasting an event that is illegal in many states, but for planning on running
ads during the event for online casinos, which are illegal in all states but legal
abroad.437 After Discovery pulled the lucrative ads, Infinity Broadcasting and
Clear Channel Communications pulled all radio ads for online gambling.438
Currently, most U.S. print and broadcast outlets refuse to accept online
gambling ads if they will be seen in the United States.439 In addition, Google,
Yahoo, and Lycos have stopped selling ad space to gaming websites. 440
Notably, these practices may also run afoul of WTO commitments. For
example, if the United States allows credit cards to be used at U.S. gambling
establishments but not at offshore gambling websites, then other countries may
again argue that the United States is discriminating against foreign suppliers of
gambling products not to protect public morals, but to protect its own gambling
industry. 44 1 Perhaps because of attention from the WTO, the DOJ has been
431 See Casino City, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, No. 04-557-B-M3, slip op. at 7 (M.D.
La. Feb. 15, 2005) (granting the DOJ's motion to dismiss for lack of standing against the
plaintiff's claim that the DOJ's threatened action would violate the First Amendment).
Some states employed the same tactics. During 1998 and 1999, the Florida Attorney
General sent cease and desist letters to ten advertising companies that represented online
casinos. Walters, supra note 295, at 447.
436 See Woellert, supra note 296, at 66 (describing the investigation of the publisher of
Pro Football Weekly, a popular Chicago trade paper that had run the ads for decades, and
the publisher's subsequent decision to pull the ads).
437 Megan Fiese, Note, Rolling the Dice: Are Online Gambling Advertisers "Aiding and
Abetting" Criminal Activity or Exercising First Amendment-Protected Commercial
Speech?, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 547, 555 (2005).
438 Id.
431 See David Kesmodel, Internet Casinos Get Creative With Ads, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2,
2005, at B2 (stating that online casinos have had to resort to alternative methods of
advertising in light of media outlets rejecting their advertising). Casino City, Inc., a small
gambling information website that had previously accepted ads for gambling sites, filed a
complaint against the DOJ in the Middle District of Louisiana seeking a declaratory
judgment that the DOJ's stance ran afoul of the First Amendment. The Middle District held
that Casino City did not have standing because the company had not itself received a letter
and was under no threat of prosecution. Casino City, No. 04-557-B-M3, slip op. at 7.
Casino City has appealed to the Fifth Circuit. Casino City, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, No.
04-557-B-M3 (Apr. 12, 2005) (notice of appeal). Notably, the Fifth Circuit is the one
circuit that has previously held that nonsports online gambling is not illegal under federal
law. In re Mastercard Int'l Inc. Internet Gambling Litig., 313 F.3d 257, 263 (5th Cir. 2002).
440 Kearney, supra note 48, at 298.
441 See discussion ofU.S. WTO obligations, supra Part V.B.I .c.
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silent on online gaming advertising in the past year.442
D. International Response to U.S. Efforts to Prohibit Internet Gambling
In Spring 2003, Antigua and Barbuda complained to the World Trade
Organization that the laws of the U.S. government, read in conjunction with
the anti-gambling laws of several states, amounted to a prohibition of foreign
online gaming providers in contravention of the General Agreement on Trade
in Service (GATS). When a requested "consultation" 443 did not result in an
understanding, the Caribbean country requested that a panel be organized to
hear the dispute.444 The Dispute Settlement Panel's report found that the
United States was in violation of its GATS commitments by prohibiting
Internet gambling provided by offshore suppliers.445  The United States
appealed that finding, and unfortunately the resulting report by the Appellate
Body4 46 is less than clear.
The Panel had concluded that the laws of the United States, including the
Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the Illegal Gambling Business Act, as well as the
laws of Louisiana, Massachusetts, South Dakota, and Utah, had the cumulative
effect of prohibiting the delivery of gambling and betting services from foreign
suppliers in contravention of its GATS commitments.447 The Panel found that
the United States had made commitments regarding gambling and betting
services and as such had to "accord services and service suppliers of Antigua
treatment no less favourable than that provided for under the terms" of that
agreement. 448 The United States had argued that it was allowed to prohibit
Internet gambling out of necessity to ensure public morals and public order,
namely to protect against money laundering, fraud, underage gambling, and
442 See Kesmodel, supra note 439, at B2 (quoting one attorney for offshore Internet
casinos as saying, "The bottom line here is the supposed crackdown [by the Justice
department] never happened.").
443 Request for Consultations by Antigua and Barbuda, United States Measures
Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/1 (Mar.
27, 2003), available at 2003 WL 1697761; Request for Consultations by Antigua and
Barbuda, addendum, United States - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/1/Add. 1 (Apr. 10, 2003), available at 2003 WL
1854666.
144 Antigua Panel Request, supra note 419, at 2 (requesting the Dispute Settlement Body
to establish a panel to examine whether the United States' "total prohibition of gambling
and betting services offered from outside the United States" conflicts "with the United
States' obligations under GATS and its Schedule of Specific Commitments").
445 Panel Report, supra note 368, at 273.
446 Appellate Report, supra note 421, at 123-26.
441 Panel Report, supra note 368, at 272 (finding not only that the United States had
made specific commitments regarding "gambling and betting services," but also that its
stated reason for exception public morals and public safety was not justified).
448 Id.
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organized crime.449 However, to use this exception to its GATS commitments,
the U.S. government would have to show that the laws in question did not act
in an arbitrary or discriminatory way.450 Specifically, the Panel did not believe
that the United States applied its prohibition on the remote supply of gambling
services in a nondiscriminatory manner because, among other things, the
United States allows for gambling over the Internet for horse racing and dog
racing at various domestic locations. 451
The Appellate Body narrowed the opinion of the original panel, but retained
the specific finding that
the United States has not shown, in the light of the Interstate Horseracing
Act, that the prohibitions embodied in those measures are applied to both
foreign and domestic service suppliers of remote betting services for
horse racing and, therefore, has not established that these measures satisfy
the requirements of the chapeau.
452
Both sides claimed victory. The United States stated that the Appellate
Body had vindicated the right of the U.S. government to prohibit Internet
gaming. 453 Although the Appellate Body had ordered the United States to
harmonize its horse racing laws with its WTO commitments, some reports
stated that the U.S. government took the position that it did not have to alter its
current laws at all. 454 However, the government of Antigua also pronounced
441 Id. at 64 (stating as the primary United States public safety concerns "(i) the risk of
under age gambling; (ii) the risk of increased pathological gambling; (iii) the risk of abuse
of non-domestic service providers for money laundering purposes; and (iv) the heightened
risk of crime, fraud and related consumer protection issues"). Under Article XIV(a), a
country may be granted an exception for laws that are "necessary to protect public morals or
to maintain public order." Id. at 108.
450 Id. at 241. Article XIV requires that the measure that is to be justified under the
public morality and public order exception may not be "applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination between countries where like
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on trade in services." Jd. at 112.
451 Id. at 27 1:
[O]n the basis of evidence provided to the Panel relating to the domestic enforcement
of the US prohibition on the remote supply of wagering services for horse racing...
and in light of the ambiguity relating to the Interstate Horseracing Act ... we believe
that the United States has not demonstrated that it applies its prohibition on the remote
supply of these services in a consistent manner as between those supplied domestically
and those that are supplied from other Members.
452 Appellate Report, supra note 421, at 126.
451 See Paul Bluestein, U.S. Claims Victory on Web Betting Ban, WASH. POST, Apr. 8,
2005, at E4 (citing the acting U.S. trade representative, Peter F. Allgeier, as saying that the
United States would be in compliance with WTO rules after it "'clarifies' certain Internet
gambling restrictions").
454 See Liz Benston, WTO Ruling Provides Scope for U.S. Online Gambling Ban, LAS
VEGAS SUN, Apr. 7, 2005, at C1 (stating that as a result of winning "key arguments before
the WTO .... the U.S. Trade Representative said it won't ask Congress to weaken
restrictions on online betting").
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victory, 455 and predicted that these proceedings would chill any further
restrictions by the U.S. government, including any new proposals to
criminalize the use of credit cards for Internet gambling.456 Unfortunately, the
murky legal environment of Internet gambling was not made much clearer by
the WTO proceedings. However, the proceedings did clarify certain points for
the future, including the foundational fact that the WTO takes the position that
the U.S. government has made GATS commitments regarding gambling
services.457 In addition, the WTO proceedings do reflect that the WTO takes
cross-border provision of gambling services very seriously and will not
hesitate to examine carefully both the text of current laws, the operation and
effect of current laws, and the motivations behind them.
VII. HARMONIZING THE REGULATION OF INTERNET SPECULATION
As discussed in Part III, similar forms of speculation are not regulated
consistently. Wagering activities traditionally labeled as gambling are
restricted far more than similar wagering activities traditionally labeled as
investing, even though the costs and benefits of each are roughly of the same
magnitude. And, as discussed in Part V, the federal government is poised to
continue this inconsistency by banning online gambling of any kind, a policy
that is not only inconsistent with regulation of online trading, a similar type of
speculation, but also inconsistent with existing federal policy leaving the
regulation of most gambling to the individual states.
Regulation of speculation activities is overdue for harmonization. As
discussed in Part III, harmonization could take the form of liberalization of
gambling laws or radically tightening securities laws. Completely revamping
securities laws may be not feasible at this stage in the evolution of the U.S.
stock market. Various types of regulation, from tightening suitability rules to
narrowing derivative choices to taxation of trading, could steer investors away
from active trading programs to long-term investments.458
However, even with improvements to securities regulation, a great divide
411 US and Antigua Dispute WTO Ruling, BBC NEWS, Apr. 7, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4422457.stm (quoting lawyers for Antigua as saying
"[t]his is a landmark victory for Antigua").
456 Benston, supra note 454 (quoting Mark Mendel, counsel for the government of
Antigua, as saying that the Appellate Report "is expected to end subpoenas or threats of
prosecution from the United States Justice Department to U.S. companies who choose to do
business with Antigua offshore gaming companies" and that it would require the United
States to allow credit card companies to provide credit to Antiguan gaming sites just as
those companies provide credit to gamblers at legalized casinos in the United States).
457 See Bluestein, supra note 453 (citing the director of Public Citizen's Global Trade
Watch, a group critical of the WTO, as predicting that the WTO report would pave the way
for other countries to complain against states that ban Internet gambling but allow lotteries
or tribal gaming).
458 Stout, supra note 12, at 699.
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will still exist between the almost laissez-faire regulation of capital markets
and the tightening regulation of gambling speculation. 459  Deregulating
gambling will not happen instantly, because such a broad change could only be
effected by the federal government. Depriving states of the ability to regulate
gambling could trigger regulatory concerns. Although banning online
gambling by federal fiat might survive rational basis review under the
Commerce Clause as analogous to federal laws banning controlled
substances, 460 forbidding individual states to ban gambling may not.
At a minimum, the federal government should abandon its stance on both
online gambling and sports gambling and leave to individual states the decision
of whether to prohibit these activities or to regulate and tax them. If federalism
promotes experimentation by the individual states, then gambling has been a
perfect example of the kind of experimentation that can occur, with each state
determining what is best for its populace. Securities laws even provide a
model for this type of two-tier system, with states' blue-sky laws separately
regulating certain investments.
CONCLUSION
At a basic level, gambling and investing are identical activities of wagering
on an outcome in an environment of uncertainty. In addition, both risk-taking
activities have been present in the American culture for all of its history. At
some point over 100 years ago, public attitudes of the two types of speculation
diverged, with investing being labeled as socially desirable and therefore
supported by law, and gambling being labeled as socially undesirable and
therefore prohibited by law. This divergence was based not on any logical
differences in the activities, but instead on the classes of people that
participated in these activities and who profited from them. Stock brokers,
stock exchanges, and their wealthy clients benefited from this legal distinction;
working class gamblers and bookmakers did not.
The decision to prohibit an activity should be based on a sound analysis of
its costs and benefits, including whether any important freedoms are associated
with that activity. Similar activities should be regulated similarly, without
regard to traditional labels, pretextual and inconsistent morality arguments, or
discriminatory categorizations based on class.
Although both the state and federal governments have allowed many types
of gambling in the past thirty years, the recent backlash against Internet
gambling demonstrates that this liberalization did not reflect a new
commitment to regulating gambling similarly to other economically identical
activities. Instead, gambling liberalization reflects a commitment to legalize
451 See Eggert, supra note 325, at 280-81 (discussing the increasing regulation of the
gambling industry by the federal government).
460 See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2195 (2005) (holding that the Commerce
Clause allows the federal government to regulate the home cultivation and use of marijuana
notwithstanding California state law to the contrary).
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gambling that is financially lucrative to state and federal governments.
Internet gambling is not profitable to these regulators, and so it has not been
legalized. Moreover, to argue that online gambling should not be permitted,
regulators have renewed moralistic arguments without acknowledging that
these arguments apply equally against the traditional gambling activities that
they have voted to legalize.
Notably, although online investing has the same potential for negative
externalities as online gambling, online investing has been accepted and even
embraced as the newest manner for investing, whether rationally or
irrationally, in the capital markets. Predicated upon the notion that online
activities should not be regulated differently than physical activities merely
because they are performed on the Internet, the SEC has chosen not to restrict
online investing. Analogously, the federal government should allow states to
regulate online gambling in the same way that those states choose to regulate
similar physical gambling activities.

